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Abstract
This paper presents an implementation of the well-known
[Smets & Wouters 2003] model for Euro Area using the gEcon pack-
age — what we call the “third generation” DSGE modelling toolbox. Our
exercise serves three goals. First, we show how gEcon can be used to im-
plement an important — from both applications and historical perspective
— model. Second, through rigorous exposition enforced by the gEcon’s
block-agent paradigm we analyse all the Smets-Wouters model’s building
blocks. Last, but not least, the implementation presented here serves as
a natural starting point for important from applications point of view
extensions, like opening the economy, introducing non-lump-sum taxes,
or adding sectors to the model economy. Full model implementation is
attached.
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1 Introduction
The idea that the economy is a complex system propagating exogenous random disturbances dates back
to the works of [Frish 1933] and [Slutsky 1937] in the ’30s of the past century. It re-emerged after the Key-
nesian Revolution in the ’70s with the stochastic growth model of [Brock & Mirman 1972] and the works
∗The views expressed herein are solely of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Chancellery of the Prime
Minister of the Republic of Poland.
†gEcon is an open-source package and can be downloaded from http://gecon.r-forge.r-project.org/.
‡E-mail: gklima@users.sourceforge.net.
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of Lucas [Lucas Jr. 1972], [Lucas Jr. 1975]. These papers were theoretical in nature. It was the seminal
work of [Kydland & Prescott 1982] that tried to quantify the implications of dynamic general equilibrium
model with stochastic shocks and gave birth to the real business cycle (RBC) literature. However, the as-
sumptions and properties of RBC models like perfect competition and money neutrality were questioned
from the very beginning. As a result, in the ’90s RBC models were modified to incorporate monopolistic
competition and price rigidities [Rotemberg & Woodford 1997] leading to the so-called New Keynesian /
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) modelling school. The model of [Christiano et al. 2005]
is widely recognised as the canonical DSGE model, which accounts for money non-neutrality and prolonged
but eventually decaying (“hump-shaped”) response to monetary policy shocks. Following this work and using
Bayesian techniques [Smets & Wouters 2003] estimated the first DSGE model to be used in policy making
(the model was used by the European Central Bank).
As RBC/DSGE models are complex and non-linear, they have to be solved using numerical methods. In the
’80s each researcher had to implement the entire model from scratch, most often in FORTRAN.1 The numeri-
cal approach usually involved the linear-quadratic (LQ) approximation, which reduced the problem to solving
the algebraic Riccati equation, familiar from control theory. The technological revolution of the ’80s and ’90s
— growing popularity of personal computers, exponentially increasing computational power, rapid growth
of the Internet, and emergence of software packages like MATLAB — was bound to reduce the barriers to
entry to dynamic general equilibrium modelling. In the ’90s Harald Uhlig’s tool-kit [Uhlig et al. 1995] was
released, followed by the solver by Christopher Sims [Sims 2002]. It was no longer necessary to implement
one’s own dynamic linear rational expectations solver (or LQ optimal control problem solver) and the cost
of model implementation was dramatically reduced.2 Still, researchers had to derive model equations and
perturbation matrices, as the numerical approach was 1st order perturbation around the deterministic steady
state. From today’s perspective these packages can be viewed as the “first generation” of DSGE modelling
tools — although they significantly reduced the cost of applying numerical methods, they still required a lot
of pen & paper derivations. Deriving the 1st order perturbation matrices (not to mention higher order
approximation) is a tedious task even for a model with only 10 variables. Automation of this process was
a natural next step in the evolution of DSGE modelling software. This step was taken with the Dynare
project [Adjemian et al. 2013]. This “second generation” toolbox internally handles the creation of pertur-
bation matrices (symbolic differentiation) and then passes them on to the embedded solvers. The (almost)
only input required is the system of non-linear equations describing the behaviour of the model economy. It
should come as no surprise that over time Dynare has become the de facto standard in DSGE modelling.
Deriving first order conditions for agents’ optimisation problems in standard economic models is not a difficult
task to a trained economist, yet it becomes tedious and error-prone when the size of the model increases
or many amendments are made in the model construction process. Changes in preferences, technology, or
introduction of taxes require part of the model equations to be derived again. In addition, the costs of model
debugging increase at least quadratically with the model size. These considerations have led us to developing
gEcon [Klima et al. 2015] — the “third generation” DSGE modelling package. In gEcon, models are written
in the form of decision problems of the economic agents (consumers, producers, etc.) and market clearing
conditions — all equilibrium equations are derived automatically. The algorithm employed is described in
detail in [Klima & Retkiewicz-Wijtiwiak 2014]. There are many advantages of writing models in such a way.
First of all, the organisation of the input model file is clear and logical. Writing optimisation problems
explicitly makes it easier to grasp the structure of the model. Each agent is described in a separate block,
which simplifies the process of modifying and extending the model. Since the implementation of the model is
independent of the chosen form of the first-order approximation (linear or log-linear), changing the approach
does not involve any additional effort, as opposed to e.g. Dynare.
This paper serves three goals. First, we show how gEcon can be used to implement an important —
1Thus fulfilling Robert Lucas’ call for economists “to write a FORTRAN program that will accept specific economic policy
rules as ‘inputs’ and will generate as ‘output’ statistics describing the operating characteristics of times series we care about,
which are predicted to result from these policies”. [Lucas Jr. 1980]
2Nowadays, solving small scale RBC/DSGE model using these toolboxes is a standard homework assignment in graduate
schools.
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from both applications and historical perspective — model. Second, through rigorous exposition enforced
by the gEcon’s block-agent paradigm we analyse all the [Smets & Wouters 2003] model’s building blocks.
Last, but not least, the implementation presented here serves as a natural starting point for important from
applications point of view extensions, like opening the economy, introducing non-lump-sum taxes or adding
sectors to the model economy.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains the description of the consumers’ problem. It in-
volves the choice between labour and consumption, the determination of optimal amount of investments
and the utilisation rate of capital, and the determination of optimal wage in Calvo wage setting mechanism.
Labour is heterogeneous and bundled by a representative firm. Only part of households can request new level
of wages in each period. In section 3 firms are introduced to the model and the Calvo price setting mechanism
is described. Two types of firms are present in the model economy — intermediate and final, with only part
of intermediate firms being able to fully adjust prices. The behaviour of the government and of the mone-
tary authority is described in section 4. Market clearing and aggregation conditions complement the model
description (section 5). Each section presents code listings with the gEcon implementation of the relevant
optimisation problems. Since the output gap in the Taylor rule is calculated relative to the economy without
frictions or mark-up shocks, along with each component of the model with rigidities its flexible counterpart
is described, as well as its gEcon implementation. It has to be stressed that the model presented here is
not a one-to-one replica of the original [Smets & Wouters 2003] model. The differences are summarised in
section 6. Some of them are minor modifications that have no effect on the remaining solution or dynamics
of the model. However, a few alterations result from the different approach to solving the problem or act
as corrections. Section 7 briefly describes the solution procedure and obtained results. Section 8 concludes.
The appendices contain the full list of variables in the model (Appendix A), the full gEcon implementation
of the model with accompanying R code (Appendix B),3 steady-state values and standard deviations of vari-
ables (Appendix C), basic model statistics (Appendix D), and comparison between responses to the shocks
in economies with and without nominal rigidities (Appendix E).
Signature [SW’03] will be understood as a reference to [Smets & Wouters 2003] hereafter. The equations
presented in [SW’03] will be referred to as (X–SW’03), X being the ordinal number of the equation in [SW’03].
2 Households
General consumer problem
In the model economy there is a continuum of identical infinitely lived households (indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]).
Households maximise their expected lifetime utility Ut(i) given by Et[
∑∞
τ=0 β
τut+τ (i)], where β is the discount
factor and ut is the instantaneous utility. The objective can be rewritten in a recursive manner as:
Ut(i) = ut(i) + βEt[Ut+1(i)] . (1)
The instantaneous utility function u is separable in consumption (C) and labour (L), and it assumes the fol-
lowing form4:
ut(i) = ε
b
t
(
1
1− σc (Ct(i)−Ht)
1−σc − ωε
L
t
1 + σl
(Lt(i))
1+σl
)
, (2)
with consumption habit given by Ht = hCt−1, where h is the intensity of habit formation. The utility
function is increasing in the difference between the current household’s consumption and the average con-
sumption in the economy from the previous period.5 σc represents the coefficient of relative risk aversion,
while σl is the reciprocal of the elasticity of labour with respect to the wage. The instantaneous utility
3The code can also be downloaded from the gEcon website: http://gecon.r-forge.r-project.org/.
4The parameter of labour disutility ω is set to 1 in [SW’03].
5This means that the so-called external habit formation is introduced. A common alternative is the internal habit formation,
in which agents recognize their own influence on the formation of the habit.
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of the household may be affected by any of the two preference shocks: εbt is a shock to the discount rate
influencing the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, while εLt represents a shock to the labour supply.
Both shocks follow the first order autoregressive processes (with i.i.d. innovations):6
log εbt = ρb log ε
b
t−1 + η
b
t ,
log εLt = ρL log ε
L
t−1 − ηLt .
The problem is solved subject to the budget constraint and the law of motion for capital.
The household’s total income comes from the following sources:
• Labour income modified by the net cash-flow from the common insurance. Real wage Wt(i) is earned
for each unit of labour Lt(i) supplied. Payments At(i) ensure that the wage bill is equally distributed
among all households and
∫
At(i)di = 0 for each period.
• Return on capital reduced by the cost associated with the level of capacity utilisation. The amount
of capital offered by the household is determined by the capital stock Kt−1(i) accumulated in the previ-
ous period, and the level of capacity utilisation zt(i). The cost of capacity utilisation is given by the func-
tion Ψ.
• Dividends Divt(i) paid out by firms.
• Proceeds from bonds purchased in the previous period.
The disposable income is reduced by the lump-sum tax Tt levied by the government.
The cost function Ψ associated with the level of capacity utilisation is strictly increasing (Ψ′ > 0), convex
(Ψ′′ > 0), and equals 0 if the argument equals 1. The form adopted here (after [Adjemian et al. 2007]) is:
Ψ(zt) =
r¯k
ψ
(eψ(zt−1) − 1), (3)
where r¯k is the steady-state level of return on capital and ψ is the scale parameter.
Households rent capital to producers on a perfectly competitive market at rate rkt . In order to increase their
income from renting capital, individual households can either intensify the use of the available capital stock
or invest. Both operations are costly.
Households divide their income and financial wealth between consumption, investment It(i) and the purchase
of one-period bonds. Let BNt (i) denote the (nominal) face value of bonds purchased at time t. The cost
(in nominal terms) of purchasing bonds is equal to BNt (i)/Rt, where Rt is the (gross) nominal interest rate.
The cost of purchasing BNt (i) bonds in real terms is equal to B
N
t (i)/(RtPt), where Pt is the price level.
At time t bonds bought in the previous period bring BNt−1(i) nominally and B
N
t−1(i)/Pt in real terms.
The household’s budget constraint stated in real terms is given by:
Ct(i) + It(i) +
BNt (i)
RtPt
=
= (Wt(i)Lt(i) +At(i)) + (r
k
t zt(i)Kt−1(i)−Ψ(zt(i))Kt−1(i)) +Divt(i) +
BNt−1(i)
Pt
− Tt.
In general, the price level Pt is non-stationary. Using Bt(i) = B
N
t (i)/Pt to denote the value of bonds in real
terms and pit = Pt/Pt−1 to denote inflation, one can rewrite the household’s budget constraint as follows:
Ct(i) + It(i) +
Bt(i)
Rt
=
= (Wt(i)Lt(i) +At(i)) + (r
k
t zt(i)Kt−1(i)−Ψ(zt(i))Kt−1(i)) +Divt(i) +
BNt−1(i)
Pt−1
Pt−1
Pt
− Tt
6A minor change was made relative to [SW’03] in order to achieve the desired interpretation of ηLt as a positive labour supply
shock.
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and finally:
Ct(i) + It(i) +
Bt(i)
Rt
=
= (Wt(i)Lt(i) +At(i)) + (r
k
t zt(i)Kt−1(i)−Ψ(zt(i))Kt−1(i)) +Divt(i) +
Bt−1(i)
pit
− Tt.
(4)
The law of motion for capital is given by:
Kt(i) = (1− τ)Kt−1(i) +
[
1− S
(
εIt
It(i)
It−1(i)
)]
It(i), (5)
where τ is the capital depreciation rate and It denotes gross investment. Changes in investment are as-
sociated with additional costs. The adjustment cost function S(·) for investment is positive and its first
derivative equals zero in the steady state (i.e. S(1) = 0, ∀x 6=1S(x) > 0 and S′(1) = 0). εIt follows a first order
autoregressive process: log εIt = ρI log ε
I
t−1 + η
I
t .
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The following cost function is adopted:
S(x) =
ϕ
2
(x− 1)2, (6)
where ϕ is the scale parameter.
Since the problem described above is faced by a representative household, the net cash inflow resulting
from common insurance equals zero. gEcon implementation of the optimisation problem of a representative
household is presented in Listing 1.
block CONSUMER
{
d e f i n i t i o n s
{
u [ ] = e p s i l o n b [ ] ∗ ( (C [ ] − H [ ] ) ˆ ( 1 − s igma c ) / ( 1 − s igma c ) −
omega ∗ e p s i l o n L [ ] ∗ ( L s [ ] ) ˆ ( 1 + s igma l ) / ( 1 + s igma l ) ) ;
} ;
c o n t r o l s
{
C[ ] , K[ ] , I [ ] , B [ ] , z [ ] ;
} ;
o b j e c t i v e
{
U [ ] = u [ ] + beta ∗ E [ ] [ U[ 1 ] ] ;
} ;
c o n s t r a i n t s
{
C [ ] + I [ ] + B [ ] / R [ ] =
W[ ] ∗ L [ ] +
r k [ ] ∗ z [ ] ∗ K[−1 ] − r k [ s s ] / p s i ∗ ( exp ( p s i ∗ ( z [ ] − 1 ) ) − 1 ) ∗ K[−1 ] +
Div [ ] + B[−1 ] / p i [ ] − T [ ] : lambda [ ] ;
K [ ] = ( 1 − tau ) ∗ K[−1 ] +
( 1 − varphi / 2 ∗ ( e p s i l o n I [ ] ∗ I [ ] / I [−1 ] − 1 ) ˆ 2 ) ∗ I [ ] : q [ ] ;
} ;
i d e n t i t i e s
{
H [ ] = h ∗ C[−1 ] ;
Q [ ] = q [ ] / lambda [ ] ;
} ;
c a l i b r a t i o n
{
beta = 0 . 99 ; # Discount f a c t o r
7One has to be cautious about the interpretation of the εIt shock. As ε
I
t is a shock to the investment cost function, its positive
values could be thought of as a negative shock to investment.
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tau = 0 . 025 ; # Capi ta l d e p r e c i a t i o n ra t e
varphi = 6 . 771 ; # Parameter o f investment adjustment co s t func t i on
p s i = 0 . 169 ; # Capacity u t i l i s a t i o n co s t parameter
s igma c = 1 . 353 ; # C o e f f i c i e n t o f r e l a t i v e r i s k ave r s i on
h = 0 . 573 ; # Habit format ion i n t e n s i t y
s i gma l = 2 . 4 ; # Rec ip roca l o f labour e l a s t i c i t y w. r . t . wage
omega = 1 ; # Labour d i s u t i l i t y parameter
} ;
} ;
block PREFERENCE SHOCKS
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
l og ( e p s i l o n b [ ] ) = rho b ∗ l og ( e p s i l o n b [−1 ] ) + eta b [ ] ;
l og ( e p s i l o n L [ ] ) = rho L ∗ l og ( e p s i l o n L [−1 ] ) − eta L [ ] ;
} ;
shocks
{
e ta b [ ] , # Pre f e r ence shock
eta L [ ] ; # Labour supply shock
} ;
c a l i b r a t i o n
{
rho b = 0 . 855 ;
rho L = 0 . 889 ;
} ;
} ;
block INVESTMENT COST SHOCKS
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
l og ( e p s i l o n I [ ] ) = r h o I ∗ l og ( e p s i l o n I [−1 ] ) + e t a I [ ] ;
} ;
shocks
{
e t a I [ ] ; # Investment shock
} ;
c a l i b r a t i o n
{
r h o I = 0 . 927 ;
} ;
} ;
Listing 1: Consumer problem
In the listing above Tobin’s q (the value of installed capital in terms of its replacement cost, denoted by Q[])
has been introduced as a ratio between the two Lagrange multipliers.
The fact that the labour supplied does not appear in the problem formulation (and is not listed as a con-
trol variable) deserves explanation. In [SW’03], households supply differentiated labour, which gives them
monopolistic power and makes them, to some extent, the wage setters. This could be reflected by making
the wage one of the decision variables. In an economy without nominal rigidities, wages can be freely set.
However, in a Calvo wage-setting scheme, a household cannot reset its wage in every period, and the time
between any two consecutive re-optimisations is random. In the next two subsections the monopolistically
competitive labour is introduced and the optimal wage setting rule for the Calvo scheme is derived explicitly.
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Labour market structure
It is assumed that households are hired by a representative competitive firm (e.g. labour agency) that bundles
differentiated labour using the following technology8:
Lt =
[∫ 1
0
Lt(i)
1
1+λw di
]1+λw
. (7)
The labour bundler’s maximisation problem is as follows:
max
Lt(i)
WtLt −
∫ 1
0
Wt(i)Lt(i)di.
The first order condition with respect to the labour supplied by each household i yields:
Lt(i) =
(
Wt(i)
Wt
)− 1+λwλw
Lt. (8)
Equation (8) determines the amount of labour of household i that the labour agency demands in response
to the wage set by the household. Substituting the obtained demand function into the zero-profit condition
allows to determine the aggregate wage:
Wt =
[∫ 1
0
Wt(i)
− 1λw di
]−λw
. (9)
Wage setting in Calvo scheme
The Calvo scheme implies that only a fraction of households receive a random wage-change signal that
is necessary to re-optimise the wage. The probability that a specific household will receive such signal
is constant and equals 1− ξw. The remaining households, which did not receive the wage-change signal, are
allowed to partially index their wages to past inflation. The indexed wages are adjusted according to:
Wt(i) =
(
Pt−1
Pt−2
)γw
Wt−1(i), (10)
where γw is the degree of wage indexation, i.e. for γw = 1 perfect indexation takes place, while if γw = 0
wages remain constant until the signal is received.
This implies that if a household cannot change its wage for τ periods, its normalized (real) wage after τ periods
is equal to:
Wt+τ (i) =
(
τ∏
s=1
piγwt+s−1
pit+s
)
Wt(i), (11)
where pit =
Pt
Pt−1
. The expression on the right hand side of equation (11) is equivalent to (Pt−1+τ/Pt−1)
γw
Pt+τ/Pt
Wt(i),
cf. (12-SW’03).
Substituting (11) in (8), we arrive at:
Lt+τ (i) =
((
τ∏
s=1
piγwt+s−1
pit+s
)
Wt(i)
Wt+τ
)− 1+λwλw
Lt+τ . (12)
8The parameter 1 + λw determines the wage mark-up over the labour disutility.
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The maximisation problem of the household that received a signal to re-optimise its wage is:
max
Wt(i)
Et
[ ∞∑
τ=0
(βξw)
τ
[
λt+τ (i)
(
τ∏
s=1
piγwt+s−1
pit+s
)
Wt(i)Lt+τ (i)− εbt+τεLt+τω
(Lt+τ (i))
1+σl
1 + σl
]]
, (13)
where λt(i) is the Lagrange multiplier from the general consumer problem representing the marginal utility
of consumption. Each component of the sum is the difference between the utility of consumption gained
from selling labour and the utility loss related to giving up leisure. The net utilities in future periods are
discounted with βτ and weighted by the cumulative probabilities of not receiving the wage-change signal ξτw.
Substituting for Lt+τ (i) from equation (12), one obtains:
max
Wt(i)
Et
 ∞∑
τ=0
(βξw)
τ
λt+τ (i)( τ∏
s=1
piγwt+s−1
pit+s
)
Wt(i)
((
τ∏
s=1
piγwt+s−1
pit+s
)
Wt(i)
Wt+τ
)− 1+λwλw
Lt+τ
−εbt+τ
εLt+τω
1 + σl
((
τ∏
s=1
piγwt+s−1
pit+s
)
Wt(i)
Wt+τ
)− (1+λw)(1+σl)λw
Lt+τ
1+σl

 .
All households set the same wage, so the indices i can be dropped. Since the markets are assumed to be com-
plete (implying perfect risk sharing), the marginal utility of consumption is also the same for any household.
The first order condition with respect to Wt(i) is:
Et
 ∞∑
τ=0
(βξw)
τ
−λt+τ
λw
(
τ∏
s=1
piγwt+s−1
pit+s
)− 1λw ( W ?t
Wt+τ
)− 1+λwλw
Lt+τ
+
(1 + λw)
λwW ?t
εbt+τε
L
t+τω
((
τ∏
s=1
piγwt+s−1
pit+s
)
W ?t
Wt+τ
)− (1+λw)(1+σl)λw
Lt+τ
1+σl

 = 0,
(14)
where W ?t denotes the optimal wage set at time t.
The first order condition involves infinite sums. In order to solve the wage-setting problem one might
proceed as in [SW’03], where the equation is log-linearised. In this way one can obtain the real wage
equation (33–SW’03). Another possibility is to transform (14) into a recursive form, following for exam-
ple [Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe 2004]. This method does not involve any approximations and allows to derive
the equations determining the steady state explicitly. The latter approach is adopted in this paper.
Rewriting (14) as two separate sums and multiplying both sides by
λwW
?
t
1+λw
yields:
1
1 + λw
W ?t Et
 ∞∑
τ=0
(βξw)τλt+τ ( τ∏
s=1
piγwt+s−1
pit+s
)− 1λw ( W ?t
Wt+τ
)− 1+λwλw
Lt+τ
 =
= Et
 ∞∑
τ=0
(βξw)
τ
εbt+τεLt+τω
((
τ∏
s=1
piγwt+s−1
pit+s
)
W ?t
Wt+τ
)− (1+λw)(1+σl)λw
Lt+τ
1+σl

 .
(15)
Let us denote the left-hand side as f1t and the expectation on the right-hand side as f
2
t . We have:
f1t = f
2
t . (16)
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The left-hand side of (15) can be transformed into a recursive form in the following manner:
f1t =
1
1 + λw
W ?t λt
(
W ?t
Wt
)− 1+λwλw
Lt+
1
1 + λw
W ?t Et
 ∞∑
τ=1
(βξw)
τλt+τ
(
τ∏
s=1
piγwt+s−1
pit+s
)− 1λw ( W ?t
Wt+τ
)− 1+λwλw
Lt+τ

=
1
1 + λw
(W ?t )
− 1λw λtWt
1+λw
λw Lt + βξwW
?
t Et
[
W ?t+1
W ?t+1
(
piγwt
pit+1
)− 1λw
×
× 1
1 + λw
∞∑
τ=0
(βξw)τλt+τ+1( τ∏
s=1
piγwt+s
pit+s+1
)− 1λw ( W ?t
Wt+τ+1
)− 1+λwλw (W ?t+1
W ?t+1
)− 1+λwλw
Lt+τ+1

=
λt
1 + λw
(W ?t )
− 1λwWt
1+λw
λw Lt + βξwEt
[(
piγwt
pit+1
)− 1λw (W ?t+1
W ?t
) 1
λw
f1t+1
]
=
λt
1 + λw
L?dt W
?
t + βξwEt
[(
piγwt
pit+1
)− 1λw (W ?t+1
W ?t
) 1
λw
f1t+1
]
, (17)
where
L?dt =
(
W ?t
Wt
)− 1+λwλw
Lt. (18)
Analogously, for the right-hand side we obtain:
f2t =ε
b
tε
L
t ω
(
Wt
W ?t
) (1+λw)(1+σl)
λw
L1+σlt + Et
 ∞∑
τ=1
(βξw)
τ
εbt+τεLt+τω
((
τ∏
s=1
piγwt+s−1
pit+s
)
W ?t
Wt+τ
)− (1+λw)(1+σl)λw
Lt+τ
1+σl


=εbtε
L
t ω
(
Wt
W ?t
) (1+λw)(1+σl)
λw
L1+σlt + βξw
(
piγwt
pit+1
)− 1λw
×
× Et
 ∞∑
τ=0
(βξw)
τ
εbt+τ+1εLt+τ+1ω
((
τ∏
s=1
piγwt+s−1
pit+s
)
W ?t
Wt+τ+1
)− (1+λw)(1+σl)λw (W ?t+1
W ?t+1
)− (1+λw)(1+σl)λw
Lt+τ+1
1+σl


=εbtε
L
t ω
(
Wt
W ?t
) (1+λw)(1+σl)
λw
L1+σlt + βξwEt
( piγwt
pit+1
)− (1+λw)(1+σl)λw (W ?t+1
W ?t
) (1+λw)(1+σl)
λw
f2t+1

=εbtε
L
t ω(L
?d
t )
1+σl + βξwEt
( piγwt
pit+1
)− (1+λw)(1+σl)λw (W ?t+1
W ?t
) (1+λw)(1+σl)
λw
f2t+1
 . (19)
In the actual model implementation we will introduce a random (i.i.d Gaussian) disturbance ηwt to equation
(16):
f1t = f
2
t + η
w
t . (20)
ηwt can be interpreted as a labour market inefficiency shock
9 — it serves as a substitute for a monopolistic
power (mark-up) shock, i.e. a shock to λw (for details see section 6).
The recursive equations (17) and (19) can be expressed in gEcon as in Listing 2 presented below.
9This is similar to the price mark-up shock introduced on page 19.
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block WAGE SETTING PROBLEM
{
d e f i n i t i o n s
{
L sta r [ ] = ( p i s t a r w [ ] ) ˆ (−( ( 1 + lambda w ) / lambda w ) ) ∗ L [ ] ;
}
i d e n t i t i e s
{
f 1 [ ] = 1 / ( 1 + lambda w ) ∗ w star [ ] ∗ lambda [ ] ∗ L sta r [ ] +
beta ∗ xi w ∗ E [ ] [ ( ( p i [ ] ˆ gamma w) / p i [ 1 ] ) ˆ (−1 / lambda w ) ∗
( w star [ 1 ] / w star [ ] ) ˆ ( 1 / lambda w ) ∗ f 1 [ 1 ] ] ;
f 2 [ ] = e p s i l o n L [ ] ∗ omega ∗ e p s i l o n b [ ] ∗ ( L s ta r [ ] ) ˆ ( 1 + s igma l ) +
beta ∗ xi w ∗ E [ ] [ ( ( p i [ ] ˆ gamma w) / p i [ 1 ] ) ˆ
(−( ( 1 + lambda w ) / lambda w ) ∗ ( 1 + s igma l ) ) ∗
( w star [ 1 ] / w star [ ] ) ˆ ( ( ( 1 + lambda w ) / lambda w ) ∗ ( 1 + s igma l ) ) ∗ f 2 [ 1
] ] ;
f 1 [ ] = f 2 [ ] + eta w [ ] ;
p i s t a r w [ ] = w star [ ] / W[ ] ;
} ;
shocks
{
eta w [ ] ; # Wage mark−up shock
} ;
c a l i b r a t i o n
{
gamma w = 0 . 763 ; # Indexat ion parameter f o r non−opt imi s ing workers
lambda w = 0 . 5 ; # Wage mark−up
xi w = 0 . 737 ; # P ro b a b i l i t y o f not r e c e i v i n g ‘ ‘ wage−change s i gna l ’ ’
} ;
} ;
Listing 2: Wage setting problem
The optimal wage W ?t determined by (17) and (19) is set by all households that have received the wage-
change signal. For the rest of the households, wages are determined by the previous-period wages and
inflation as in (11). Since the aggregate wage Wt is given by the Dixit-Stiglitz-type function (9), the equation
describing the aggregate wage evolution assumes the following form:
Wt
− 1λw = ξw
(
piγwt−1
pit
)− 1λw
Wt−1−
1
λw + (1− ξw)W ?t −
1
λw ,
which can be transformed to:
1 = ξw
(
piγwt−1
pit
)− 1λw (Wt−1
Wt
)− 1λw
+ (1− ξw) (pi?wt )−
1
λw , (21)
with pi?wt =
W?t
Wt
.
Equation (21) can be written in gEcon as in Listing 3.
block WAGE EVOLUTION
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
1 = xi w ∗ ( ( p i [−1 ] ˆ gamma w) / p i [ ] ) ˆ (−1 / lambda w ) ∗
(W[−1 ] / W[ ] ) ˆ (−1 / lambda w ) + ( 1 − xi w ) ∗ ( p i s t a r w [ ] ) ˆ (−1 / lambda w ) ;
} ;
} ;
Listing 3: Evolution of wages
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In order to formulate the labour market clearing conditions, it is helpful to introduce the index of wage
dispersion that links the demand for the aggregate labour with the total supply of all types of differentiated
labour. Integrating both sides of equation (8) gives the aggregate condition:∫ 1
0
Lt(i)di =
(∫ 1
0
(
Wt(i)
Wt
)− 1+λwλw
di
)
Lt.
Let us introduce the wage dispersion index νwt =
∫ 1
0
(
Wt(i)
Wt
)− (1+λw)λw
di and denote total labour services
provided by all households as Lst =
∫ 1
0
Lt(i)di. We have:
Lst = ν
w
t Lt. (22)
Recall that in each period 1− ξw fraction of households can re-optimise their wages and ξw households only
index them to past inflation. This leads to the recursive formula for the evolution of the wage dispersion νwt :
νwt =
∫ 1
0
(
Wt(i)
Wt
)− 1+λwλw
di =
=(1− ξw)
(
W ?t
Wt
)− 1+λwλw
+ (1− ξw)ξw
(
W ?t−1
Wt
piγwt−1
pit
)− 1+λwλw
+ (1− ξw)ξw2
(
W ?t−2
Wt
piγwt−1
pit
piγwt−2
pit−1
)− 1+λwλw
+ . . .
=(1− ξw)
(
W ?t
Wt
)− 1+λwλw
+ ξw
(
Wt−1
Wt
piγwt−1
pit
)− 1+λwλw
×
×
(1− ξw)(W ?t−1
Wt−1
)− 1+λwλw
+ (1− ξw)ξw
(
W ?t−2
Wt−1
piγwt−2
pit−1
)− 1+λwλw
+ . . .

=(1− ξw) (pi?wt )−
1+λw
λw + ξw
(
Wt−1
Wt
piγwt−1
pit
)− 1+λwλw
νwt−1. (23)
block LABOUR AGGREGATION
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
nu w [ ] = ( 1 − xi w ) ∗ p i s t a r w [ ] ˆ (−( ( 1 + lambda w ) / lambda w ) ) +
xi w ∗ ( (W[−1 ] /W[ ] ) ∗ ( ( p i [−1 ] ˆgamma w) / p i [ ] ) ) ˆ
(−( ( 1 + lambda w ) / lambda w ) ) ∗ nu w [−1 ] ;
L [ ] = L s [ ] / nu w [ ] ;
} ;
} ;
Listing 4: Labour aggregation
Consumer problem without wage rigidities
The flexible wages economy can be regarded as the specific case of the Calvo scheme with the probability
of receiving the wage-change signal equal to 1 in each period. Equations describing the economy without
rigidities could be derived by setting ξw = 0. However, the fact that all consumers may set their wage in each
period makes it possible to describe the behaviour of agents as a solution to an explicitly stated optimisation
problem. The latter approach is adopted in this subsection.
Variables describing the behaviour of this economy can be distinguished from their counterparts in the econ-
omy with rigidities by the superscript f .
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The consumer problem is given by:
max
Cft (i),K
f
t (i),I
f
t (i),B
f
t (i),z
f
t (i),L
f
t (i)
Uft (i) = ε
b
t
(
1
1− σc
(
Cft (i)−Hft
)1−σc − ωεLt
1 + σl
(Lft (i))
1+σl
)
+ βEt
[
Uft+1(i)
]
(24)
s.t.:
Cft (i) + I
f
t (i) +
Bft (i)
Rft
= Incft (i) +Div
f
t (i) +B
f
t−1(i)− T ft , (25)
Kft (i) = (1− τ)Kft−1(i) +
[
1− S
(
εIt
Ift (i)
Ift−1(i)
)]
Ift (i), (26)
where Incft (i) = (W
f,disutil
t L
f
t (i) + Π
f,ws
t (i)) + (r
k,f
t z
f
t (i)K
f
t−1(i)−Ψ(zft (i))Kft−1(i)) and Πf,wst is the monop-
olistic profit of workers. Contrary to the model with rigidities, the wage W f,disutilt is understood here as the
marginal cost of labour in terms of consumption and not the actual wage that the individuals receive. Note
that here the labour is among the control variables.
Since it is assumed that all households are symmetric their indices can be dropped. The problem is then
expressed in gEcon in the following way:
block CONSUMER FLEXIBLE
{
d e f i n i t i o n s
{
u f [ ] = e p s i l o n b [ ] ∗ ( ( C f [ ] − H f [ ] ) ˆ ( 1 − s igma c ) / ( 1 − s igma c ) −
omega ∗ e p s i l o n L [ ] ∗ L s f [ ] ˆ ( 1 + s igma l ) / ( 1 + s igma l ) ) ;
I n c i f [ ] = W d i s u t i l f [ ] ∗ L s f [ ] + P i ws f [ ] +
r k f [ ] ∗ z f [ ] ∗ K f [−1 ] −
r k f [ s s ] / p s i ∗ ( exp ( p s i ∗ ( z f [ ] − 1 ) ) − 1 ) ∗ K f [−1 ] ;
} ;
c o n t r o l s
{
C f [ ] , K f [ ] , I f [ ] , B f [ ] , z f [ ] , L s f [ ] ;
} ;
o b j e c t i v e
{
U f [ ] = u f [ ] + beta ∗ E [ ] [ U f [ 1 ] ] ;
} ;
c o n s t r a i n t s
{
C f [ ] + I f [ ] + B f [ ] / R f [ ] =
I n c i f [ ] + Div f [ ] + B f [−1 ] − T f [ ] : lambda f [ ] ;
K f [ ] = ( 1 − tau ) ∗ K f [−1 ] +
( 1 − varphi / 2 ∗ ( e p s i l o n I [ ] ∗ I f [ ] / I f [−1 ] − 1 ) ˆ2 ) ∗ I f [ ] : q f [ ] ;
} ;
i d e n t i t i e s
{
H f [ ] = h ∗ C f [−1 ] ;
Q f [ ] = q f [ ] / lambda f [ ] ;
} ;
} ;
Listing 5: Consumer problem, flexible wages economy
The problem of a labour bundler is similar to the one in the economy with wage rigidities. Specifically,
the labour agency aggregates the labour provided by households using the following aggregation technology:
Lft =
[∫ 1
0
Lft (i)
1
1+λw di
]1+λw
. (27)
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This results in similar equations for the aggregate wage and the demand for individual labour. In the flexible
wages economy, all workers demand the same wage and therefore, they face the same demand for their
services. The aggregate labour demand and supply will then be equal to the individual household’s choice.
Since households provide the same amount of labour, equation (27) can be simplified as in the following
listing.
block LABOUR AGGREGATION FLEXIBLE
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
L s f [ ] = L i f [ ] ;
L f [ ] = L s f [ ] ;
} ;
} ;
Listing 6: Labour aggregation, flexible wages economy
The main difference from the nominal rigidities economy is in the optimal wage setting problem. The mo-
nopolistic profit of workers, introduced in (25), is given by:
Πf,wst (i) =
(
W ft (i)−W f,disutilt
)
Lft (i), (28)
where W ft (i) is the actual wage charged by workers. The monopolistic profit is the surplus of the wage over
individuals’ (marginal) leisure cost multiplied by the hours worked (Lft (i)). The workers’ aim is to maximise
their monopolistic profit, while the labour agency’s demand for their kind of labour is given by the flexible
wages counterpart of equation (8).
block FLEXIBLE MONOPOLISTIC WORKER
{
c o n t r o l s
{
W i f [ ] , L i s t a r f [ ] ;
} ;
o b j e c t i v e
{
Pi ws f [ ] = ( W i f [ ] − W d i s u t i l f [ ] ) ∗ L i s t a r f [ ] ;
} ;
c o n s t r a i n t s
{
L i s t a r f [ ] = L f [ ] ∗ ( W i f [ ] / W f [ ] ) ˆ (−( 1 + lambda w ) / lambda w ) ;
} ;
i d e n t i t i e s
{
L i s t a r f [ ] = L i f [ ] ;
} ;
} ;
Listing 7: Worker’s problem, flexible wages economy
3 Firms
Households own all firms in the economy. The principal-agent problem is assumed away, so firms maximise
the present value of the profits (Πt) adjusted by the discount factor and marginal utilities of households:
Et
[∑∞
τ=0 β
τ λt+τ
λt
Πt+τ
]
. Firms attach greater importance to the profits in the states in which households’
consumption is low.
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Final good sector
The final good sector is perfectly competitive. It combines a continuum of differentiated intermediate goods
Yt(j) (indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]) into the final good denoted as Yt and sells it to households and the governe-
ment. Households can use the final good for both consumption and investment. The final good production
technology is given by:
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Yt(j)
1
1+λp dj
]1+λp
. (29)
Because there are no intertemporal effects, the final good producer’s problem is actually static. It maximises
profit10 given by:
Πt = PtYt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(j)Yt(j)dj,
where Pt(j) is the price of the jth intermediate good and Pt is the aggregate good price.
The first order condition with respect to Yt(j) implies the following demand function for the jth intermediate
good:
Yt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)− 1+λpλp
Yt. (30)
The parameter λp determines the steady-state mark-up of firms producing intermediate goods and can be
interpreted as a measure of their market power. The equation for aggregate price level Pt can be derived
by using the zero-profit condition for perfectly competitive firms:
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
− 1λp dj
]−λp
. (31)
Intermediate goods producers
Each intermediate good Yt(j) is produced by a monopolistically competitive firm j facing the Cobb–Douglas
production function with fixed costs Φ11:
Yt(j) = ε
a
tK
d
t (j)
αLdt (j)
1−α − Φ. (32)
Kdt (j) and L
d
t (j) denote the demand of the jth firm for capital and labour respectively, α stands for the capital
share in the product, and εat is a stochastic productivity level. The productivity level is common for all firms
and follows the autoregressive process:
log(εat ) = ρa log(ε
a
t−1) + η
a
t , (33)
where ηat is an i.i.d. Gaussian shock. The firms employ bundled labour by paying the wage Wt for each unit
and rent capital from households at the rental rate rkt .
The intermediate good producer’s optimisation problem may be divided into two parts:
• the problem of determining the demand for labour (Ldt ) and capital (Kdt ) so as to minimise the cost
of producing Yt(j) amount of good,
• the problem of setting the optimal price (and indirectly production level), maximising the expected
profit.
10In equilibrium the final good producer will earn zero profits.
11The fixed costs are frequently introduced in order to ensure zero profits of monopolistically competitive firms.
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The first problem can be formulated as:
min
Ldt (j),K
d
t (j)
WtL
d
t (j) + r
k
tK
d
t (j) s.t. Yt(j) = ε
a
tK
d
t (j)
αLdt (j)
1−α − Φ (34)
or equivalently as:
max
Ldt (j),K
d
t (j)
−WtLdt (j)− rktKdt (j) s.t. Yt(j) = εatKdt (j)αLdt (j)1−α − Φ. (35)
Thanks to the constant returns to scale, the marginal cost is independent of the produced amount of good
and equal among all firms.12 This observation significantly simplifies the solution of the optimal pricing
problem by allowing to treat marginal cost as given to the firm when it decides on price.
The optimisation problem may be stated in gEcon language as in the following code listing. In [SW’03]
the fixed cost parameter has not been given explicitly. Instead, it has been assumed that the steady-state
ratio of final output increased by the fixed cost to the final output is equal to 1.408. This condition is imposed
in the calibration section.
12This is a standard result. Consider the problem:
min
K,L
rK + wL s.t. F (K,L) = y¯ (= y + Φ),
where F satisfies F (tK, tL) = tF (K,L) (is homogeneous of order 1). Lagrange function is given by:
L = rK + wL+ λ(y¯ − F (K,L))
and the first order conditions are:
r = λF1(K,L), w = λF2(K,L)
implying:
r
w
=
F1(K,L)
F2(K,L)
.
Let K′, L′ denote the solution when y¯ = 1. Consider (K′′, L′′) = y¯(K′, L′). We claim that (K′′, L′′) is the solution to the general
problem. (K′′, L′′) satisfies the constraint:
F (K′′, L′′) = F (y¯K′, y¯L′) = y¯F (K′, L′) = y¯
and the first order condition (we use the fact that first derivatives are homogeneous of order 0):
F1(K′′, L′′)
F2(K′′, L′′)
=
F1(y¯K′, y¯L′)
F2(y¯K′, y¯L′)
=
F1(K′, L′)
F2(K′, L′)
=
r
w
.
Now we have:
rK′′ + wL′′ = ry¯K′ + wy¯L′ = (rK′ + wL′)y¯.
This implies that the cost is proportional to y¯.
Note that the value of the Lagrange multiplier does not depend on y¯ (by homogeneity of order 0 of the first derivatives).
Moreover, we have (using the first order conditions and Euler’s homogeneous function theorem):
rK′ + wL′ = λF1(K′, L′)K′ + λF2(K′, L′)L′ = λ(F1(K′, L′)K′ + F2(K′, L′)L′) = λF (K′, L′) = λ.
The Lagrange multiplier is therefore equal to the marginal cost.
For the specific case of Cobb–Douglas technology F (K,L) = AKαL1−α, the marginal cost is actually given by:
1
A
(
w
1− α
)1−α ( r
α
)α
.
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block FIRM
{
c o n t r o l s
{
K j d [ ] , L j d [ ] ;
} ;
o b j e c t i v e
{
t c j [ ] = − L j d [ ] ∗ W[ ] − K j d [ ] ∗ r k [ ] ;
} ;
c o n s t r a i n t s
{
Y j [ ] = e p s i l o n a [ ] ∗ K j d [ ] ˆ alpha ∗ L j d [ ] ˆ ( 1 − alpha ) − Phi : mc [ ] ;
} ;
c a l i b r a t i o n
{
alpha = 0 . 3 ; # Capi ta l share in output
( Y j [ s s ] + Phi ) / Y j [ s s ] = 1 . 408 −> Phi ; # Ca l i b r a t i on o f f i x e d c o s t s
} ;
} ;
block TECHNOLOGY
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
l og ( e p s i l o n a [ ] ) = rho a ∗ l og ( e p s i l o n a [−1 ] ) + eta a [ ] ;
} ;
shocks
{
e ta a [ ] ; # Product iv i ty shock
} ;
c a l i b r a t i o n
{
rho a = 0 . 823 ;
} ;
} ;
Listing 8: Intermediate good firm problem
Price setting in Calvo scheme
Price setting is the second part of the firms’ problem. Our presentation of the price setting Calvo scheme
will closely mimic that of the wage setting problem.
The firms producing intermediate goods set prices for their products to maximise profit. However, they
require a price-change signal in order to be able to reset their prices. The probability of receiving such signal
(1 − ξp) is equal for each firm and constant in each period. In particular, it does not depend on the time
elapsed from the last reoptimisation. The firms that cannot reset their prices in a given period apply (partial)
price indexation based on inflation from the previous period (pit−1 =
Pt−1
Pt−2
). The actual rate of indexation is
equal to pi
γp
t−1, where γp is the indexation parameter. Consequently, if the firm cannot change its price set
in period t for τ periods, then the price for its products in period t+ τ is equal to
∏τ
s=1 pi
γp
t+s−1Pt(j).
The optimisation problem of firms which are allowed to reset their prices can be stated using the difference
between the revenues from sales and costs:
max
Pt(j)
Et
[ ∞∑
τ=0
(βξp)
τ λt+τ
λt
(∏τ
s=1 pi
γp
t+s−1
Pt+τ
Pt(j)−mct+τ
)
Yt+τ (j)
]
(36)
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given the following demand function:
Yt+τ (j) =
((∏τ
s=1 pi
γp
t+s−1
)
Pt(j)
Pt+τ
)− (1+λp)λp
Yt. (37)
The term ξτp in the discount factor is used to weigh payoffs using cumulative probability of not receiving
the price-change signal. By substituting the expression for the demand (37) into the maximisation prob-
lem (36), one can rewrite the latter as:
max
Pt(j)
Et
 ∞∑
τ=0
(βξp)
τ λt+τ
λt

(( τ∏
s=1
pi
γp
t+s−1
)
Pt(j)
Pt+τ
)− 1λp
−mct+τ
((
τ∏
s=1
pi
γp
t+s−1
)
Pt(j)
Pt+τ
)− (1+λp)λp Yt+τ

 .
(38)
Differentiating the expression (38) with respect to the price and equating the derivative to zero yields:
Et
 ∞∑
τ=0
(βξp)
τ λt+τ
λt
− 1
λp
((
τ∏
s=1
pi
γp
t+s−1
)
P ?t
Pt+τ
)− 1λp 1
P ?t
+
(1 + λp)
λp
mct+τ
P ?t
((
τ∏
s=1
pi
γp
t+s−1
)
P ?t
Pt+τ
)− (1+λp)λp Yt+τ

 = 0,
(39)
where P ?t denotes the optimal price set at time t. As firms are identical, they set the same prices and their in-
dices can be dropped.
Similarly to the wage setting problem, the first order condition is expressed as an infinite sum. In [SW’03],
the log-linearisation of (39) leads to what is commonly referred to as the “new-Keynesian Phillips curve”
(32–SW’03). However, our approach will follow [Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe 2004], i.e. we shall rewrite the first
order condition in a recursive way.
Let us rewrite (39) as:
Et
 ∞∑
τ=0
(βξp)
τ
λt+τ
− 1
λp
((
τ∏
s=1
pi
γp
t+s−1
pit+s
)
P ?t
Pt
)− 1λp
P ?t
−1
+
(1 + λp)
λp
mct+τ
((
τ∏
s=1
pi
γp
t+s−1
pit+s
)
P ?t
Pt
)− (1+λp)λp
P ?t
−1
Yt+τ

 = 0.
(40)
Multiplying both sides by P ?t
(
P?t
Pt
) (1+λp)
λp
gives:
Et
 ∞∑
τ=0
(βξp)
τ
λt+τ
− 1
λp
(
τ∏
s=1
pi
γp
t+s−1
pit+s
)− 1λp P ?t
Pt
+
(1 + λp)
λp
mct+τ
(
τ∏
s=1
pi
γp
t+s−1
pit+s
)− (1+λp)λp Yt+τ

 = 0.
(41)
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Rearranging we arrive at the condition:
Et
 ∞∑
τ=0
(βξp)
τ
λt+τ
(
τ∏
s=1
pi
γp
t+s−1
pit+s
)− 1λp P ?t
Pt
Yt+τ

= (1 + λp)Et
 ∞∑
τ=0
(βξp)
τ
λt+τmct+τ
(
τ∏
s=1
pi
γp
t+s−1
pit+s
)− (1+λp)λp
Yt+τ
 ,
(42)
which can be expressed in a recursive fashion. Let us denote the left-hand side as g1t and the expectation on
the right-hand side as g2t . We have:
g1t = (1 + λp)g
2
t . (43)
The left-hand side can be written as:
g1t = Et
 ∞∑
τ=0
(βξp)
τ
λt+τ
(
τ∏
s=1
pi
γp
t+s−1
pit+s
)− 1λp P ?t
Pt
Yt+τ

= λt
P ?t
Pt
Yt + Et
 ∞∑
τ=1
(βξp)
τ
λt+τ
(
τ∏
s=1
pi
γp
t+s−1
pit+s
)− 1λp P ?t
Pt
Yt+τ

= λt
P ?t
Pt
Yt + (βξp)
P ?t
Pt
Et
Pt+1
P ?t+1
(
pi
γp
t
pit+1
)− 1λp ∞∑
τ=0
(βξp)
τ
λt+τ+1
(
τ∏
s=1
pi
γp
t+s
pit+s+1
)− 1λp P ?t+1
Pt+1
Yt+τ+1

= λt
P ?t
Pt
Yt + (βξp)
P ?t
Pt
Et
[
Pt+1
P ?t+1
(
pi
γp
t
pit+1
)− 1λp
g1t+1
]
= λtpi
?
t Yt + (βξp)pi
?
tEt
[
1
pi?t+1
(
pi
γp
t
pit+1
)− 1λp
g1t+1
]
. (44)
pi?t =
P?t
Pt
has been introduced in order to eliminate the possibly nonstationary variable Pt from the model.
In the log-linear approximation, it can be interpreted as the percentage deviation of optimal price from
the average price in period t.
The expectation on the right-hand side of equation (42) can be transformed into:
g2t = Et
 ∞∑
τ=0
(βξp)
τ
λt+τmct+τ
(
τ∏
s=1
pi
γp
t+s−1
pit+s
)− (1+λp)λp
Yt+τ

= λtmctyt + Et
 ∞∑
τ=1
(βξp)
τ
λt+τmct+τ
(
τ∏
s=1
pi
γp
t+s−1
pit+s
)− (1+λp)λp
Yt+τ

= λtmctyt + (βξp) Et
( piγpt
pit+1
)− (1+λp)λp ∞∑
τ=0
(βξp)
τ
λt+τ+1mct+τ+1
(
τ∏
s=1
pi
γp
t+s
pit+s+1
)− (1+λp)λp
Yt+τ+1

= λtmctyt + (βξp) Et
( piγpt
pit+1
)− (1+λp)λp
g2t+1
 . (45)
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The optimal price determined by (42) can be used to simplify the equation (31) that determines the price
index. Rewriting the equation as follows:
P
− 1λp
t =
∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
− 1λp dj (46)
and then dividing firms into the optimising and non-optimising sets, we obtain:
P
− 1λp
t = ξp
(
pi
γp
t−1
)− 1λp P− 1λpt−1 + (1− ξp) (P ?t )− 1λp . (47)
The average price is influenced by the indexed average price from the previous period, optimal price in the cur-
rent period, and the probability of receiving the price-change signal. In general, the price level can be nonsta-
tionary and therefore, the expression has to be transformed by dividing both sides by P
− 1λp
t and introducing
pi?t :
1 = ξp
(
pi
γp
t−1
pit
)− 1λp
+ (1− ξp) (pi?t )−
1
λp . (48)
gEcon code for the Calvo pricing mechanism described above (equations (43), (44), (45), and (48)) is pre-
sented in Listing 9. Note that the so-called price mark-up shock (ηpt ) has been introduced to equation (43)
as an i.i.d Gaussian disturbance:
g1t = (1 + λp)g
2
t + η
p
t . (49)
This shock can be interpreted as a deviation of intermediate goods firms’ margins from their steady-state
level (see [Gali 2009] for more detailed explanation).
block PRICE SETTING PROBLEM
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
g 1 [ ] = ( 1 + lambda p ) ∗ g 2 [ ] + eta p [ ] ;
g 1 [ ] = lambda [ ] ∗ p i s t a r [ ] ∗ Y [ ] + beta ∗ x i p ∗
E [ ] [ ( p i [ ] ˆ gamma p / pi [ 1 ] ) ˆ (−1 / lambda p ) ∗
( p i s t a r [ ] / p i s t a r [ 1 ] ) ∗ g 1 [ 1 ] ] ;
g 2 [ ] = lambda [ ] ∗ mc [ ] ∗ Y [ ] + beta ∗ x i p ∗
E [ ] [ ( p i [ ] ˆ gamma p / pi [ 1 ] ) ˆ (−( ( 1 + lambda p ) / lambda p ) ) ∗ g 2 [ 1 ] ] ;
} ;
shocks
{
e ta p [ ] ; # Pr i ce mark−up shock
} ;
c a l i b r a t i o n
{
x i p = 0 . 908 ; # P r ob a b i l i t y o f not r e c e i v i n g the ‘ ‘ p r i c e−change s i gna l ’ ’
gamma p = 0 . 469 ; # Indexat ion parameter f o r non−opt imi s ing f i rms
} ;
} ;
block PRICE EVOLUTION
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
1 = x i p ∗ ( p i [−1 ] ˆ gamma p / pi [ ] ) ˆ (−1 / lambda p ) +
( 1 − x i p ) ∗ p i s t a r [ ] ˆ (−1 / lambda p ) ;
} ;
} ;
Listing 9: Price setting problem
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Similarly to the wage setting Calvo scheme, in order to state the market clearing condition for intermediate
products we shall introduce an additional variable — the price dispersion index.
The demand for the jth firm’s product in terms of aggregate product can be written as:
Yt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)− 1+λpλp
Yt. (50)
Integrating equation (50) over all firms j ∈ [0, 1] and using Y st to denote the total amount of intermediate
goods
∫ 1
0
Yt(j)dj we arrive at:
Y st =
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)− 1+λpλp
dj
Yt. (51)
Let us set:
νpt =
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)− 1+λpλp
dj.
νpt is a measure of price dispersion (for its interpretation and implications see [Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe 2004]).
Equation (51) simplifies to:
Y st = ν
p
t Yt. (52)
The law of motion for νpt can be derived as follows:
νpt =
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)− 1+λpλp
dj
=(1− ξp)
(
P ?t
Pt
)− 1+λpλp
+ (1− ξp)ξp
(
P ?t−1pi
γp
t−1
Pt
)− 1+λpλp
+ (1− ξp)ξ2p
(
P ?t−2pi
γp
t−1pi
γp
t−2
Pt
)− 1+λpλp
+ . . .
=(1− ξp)
(
P ?t
Pt
)− 1+λpλp
+ ξp
(
Pt−1pi
γp
t−1
Pt
)− 1+λpλp
×
×
(1− ξp)(P ?t−1
Pt−1
)− 1+λpλp
+ (1− ξp)ξp
(
P ?t−2pi
γp
t−2
Pt−1
)− 1+λpλp
+ . . .

=(1− ξp)
(
P ?t
Pt
)− 1+λpλp
+ ξp
(
pi
γp
t−1
pit
)− 1+λpλp
νpt−1
=(1− ξp)pi?t −
1+λp
λp + ξp
(
pi
γp
t−1
pit
)− 1+λpλp
νpt−1. (53)
As all intermediate firms face the same prices of production factors and employ identical constant-returns-to-
scale technology, the aggregate demand for production factors may be regarded as the demand for the pro-
duction factors of a representative firm. In other words, even though firms produce different amounts of
intermediate goods, the same relations between Yt(j), K
d
t (j), and L
d
t (j) hold for all j and for aggregates∫ 1
0
Yt(j)dj,
∫ 1
0
Kdt (j)dj, and
∫ 1
0
Ldt (j)dj. With a slight abuse of notation, one can state market clearing
conditions as:
Y st =Yt(j), (54)
Kdt =K
d
t (j), (55)
Ldt =L
d
t (j). (56)
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The aggregation conditions discussed above are presented in Listing 10.
block FACTOR DEMAND AGGREGATION
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
K d [ ] = K j d [ ] ;
L d [ ] = L j d [ ] ;
} ;
} ;
block PRODUCT AGGREGATION
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
Y s [ ] = Y j [ ] ;
nu p [ ] = ( 1 − x i p ) ∗ p i s t a r [ ] ˆ (−( ( 1 + lambda p ) / lambda p ) )
+ x i p ∗ ( p i [−1 ] ˆ gamma p / pi [ ] ) ˆ
(−( ( 1 + lambda p ) / lambda p ) ) ∗ nu p [−1 ] ;
Y [ ] ∗ nu p [ ] = Y s [ ] ;
} ;
} ;
Listing 10: Product and factor demand aggregation
Monopolistic competition in the flexible prices economy
Firms in the final good sector use the same aggregation technology as in (29), which results in identical
equations for aggregate price level and for the demand for the jth intermediate good. In the flexible prices
economy, all intermediate good producers operate under the same conditions and set the same price, so the de-
mand for their output is uniform. The amount of intermediate good produced by a representative firm equals
the amount of the final good. Model is closed by setting the aggregate price level to 1.
block FACTOR DEMAND AGGREGATION FLEXIBLE
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
K d f [ ] = K j d f [ ] ;
L d f [ ] = L j d f [ ] ;
} ;
} ;
block PRODUCT AGGREGATION FLEXIBLE
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
Y s f [ ] = Y j f [ ] ;
Y f [ ] = Y s f [ ] ;
} ;
} ;
block PRICE EVOLUTION FLEXIBLE
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
P f [ ] = 1 ;
} ;
} ;
Listing 11: Product and production factor demand aggregation, flexible prices economy
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The cost minimisation problem of firms producing intermediate goods is the same as in the sticky price
economy. The relevant gEcon code can be found in Appendix B. The optimal price setting problem is given
by a version of equations (36) and (37) with ξp = 0, i.e.:
max
P ft (j)
Et
[(
P ft (j)−mcft
)
Y ft (j)
]
s.t.:
Y ft (j) =
(
P ft (j)
P ft
)− (1+λp)λp
Y ft .
gEcon implementation of the price setting problem in the flexible prices economy is given below.
block PRICE SETTING PROBLEM FLEXIBLE
{
c o n t r o l s
{
Y j f [ ] , P j f [ ] ;
} ;
o b j e c t i v e
{
P i p s f [ ] = ( P j f [ ] − mc f [ ] ) ∗ Y j f [ ] ;
} ;
c o n s t r a i n t s
{
Y j f [ ] = ( P j f [ ] / P f [ ] ) ˆ (−( ( 1 + lambda p ) / lambda p ) ) ∗ Y f [ ] ;
} ;
c a l i b r a t i o n
{
C f [ s s ] / Y f [ s s ] = 0 . 6 −> lambda p ; # Ca l i b ra t i on o f the p r i c e mark−up
} ;
} ;
block FACTOR DEMAND AGGREGATION FLEXIBLE
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
K d f [ ] = K j d f [ ] ;
L d f [ ] = L j d f [ ] ;
} ;
} ;
Listing 12: Price setting problem, flexible prices economy
The calibration section above deserves a brief comment. Following [SW’03] the value of λp is calibrated
to impose steady-state consumption share in the output (0.6).
4 Fiscal and monetary authorities
Government
The government collects lump sum taxes (Tt) from households to finance its expenditure (Gt). Additionally,
it can raise money by issuing bonds (BNt ). Its behaviour is taken as exogenous by households and firms.
The government spending is subject to the stochastic disturbance (εGt ):
Gt = G¯ε
G
t , (57)
22
where εGt follows the first-order autoregression process:
log εGt = ρG log ε
G
t−1 + η
G
t (58)
with i.i.d. Gaussian error ηGt . G¯ denotes the steady-state government expenditures, so the value of disturbance
may be interpreted as the percentage deviation from the steady state.
The budget constraint of the government (in real terms) is given by:
Gt +
BNt−1
Pt
= Tt +
BNt
PtRt
,
where Rt is the gross nominal rate of return. Using Bt =
BNt
Pt
and pit =
Pt
Pt−1
, the government budget
constraint can be restated as follows:
Gt +
Bt−1
pit
= Tt +
Bt
Rt
. (59)
In equilibrium, bonds are in zero net supply and the value of collected taxes is equal to the expenditures.
gEcon implementation of equations (57), (58), and (59) is presented in Listing 13. The parameter G¯
is calibrated so that the total government spending in the steady state takes 18% of the economy output
(as in [SW’03]).
block GOVERNMENT
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
G[ ] = G bar ∗ eps i l on G [ ] ;
G[ ] + B[−1 ] / p i [ ] = T [ ] + B [ ] / R [ ] ;
} ;
c a l i b r a t i o n
{
G[ s s ] / Y[ s s ] = 0 . 18 −> G bar ; # Ca l i b ra t i on o f the steady s t a t e government
expend i ture s
} ;
} ;
block GOVERNMENT SPENDING SHOCK
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
l og ( eps i l on G [ ] ) = rho G ∗ l og ( eps i l on G [−1 ] ) + eta G [ ] ;
} ;
shocks
{
eta G [ ] ; # Government spending shock
} ;
c a l i b r a t i o n
{
rho G = 0 . 949 ;
} ;
} ;
Listing 13: Government behaviour
The government behaviour in the economy without rigidities is identical. The relevant gEcon code can
be found in Appendix B.
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The monetary authority
When setting the nominal (gross) interest rate Rt, the monetary authority takes the following factors into
account13:
• the deviation of the interest rate in the previous period (Rˆt−1) from its steady-state value (interest rate
smoothing),
• the deviation of lagged inflation from the inflation objective (pˆit−1 − p˚it)14,
• the output gap, defined as the percentage difference between the actual level of output and potential
level of output, i.e. in the absence of rigidities and mark-up shocks (Yˆt − Yˆ ft ),
• the dynamics of the output gap
((
Yˆt − Yˆ ft
)
−
(
Yˆt−1 − Yˆ ft−1
))
,
• inflation dynamics (pˆit − pˆit−1).
The monetary policy function (commonly referred to as the generalized Taylor rule) is given by:
Rˆt =ρRˆt−1 + (1− ρ){p˚it + rpi(pˆit−1 − p˚i) + rY (Yˆt − Yˆ ft )}
+ r∆pi (pˆit − pˆit−1) + r∆y (Yˆt − Yˆ ft − (Yˆt−1 − Yˆ ft−1)) + ηRt .
(60)
Elasticities rpi, rY , r∆pi , r∆y are determined by the relative weights attached by the monetary authority
to the respective deviations. The parameter ρ measures the degree of the interest rate smoothing.
The inflation objective evolves according to:
p˚it = (1− ρp¯i )˚pi + ρp¯ip˚it−1 + ηpi, (61)
where ηpi is a white noise, and p˚i a long-run inflation objective.
In the listing below, the log-deviations have been written explicitly. The inflation objective has been cali-
brated to 1. The calibrated parameters calibr pi and calibr pi obj are used to impose the steady-state
relationships on the model.
block MONETARY POLICY AUTHORITY
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
l og (R [ ] / R[ s s ] ) + c a l i b r p i = rho ∗ l og (R[−1 ] / R[ s s ] ) +
( 1 − rho ) ∗ ( l og ( p i o b j [ ] ) +
r p i ∗ ( l og ( p i [−1 ] / p i [ s s ] ) − l og ( p i o b j [ ] ) ) +
r Y ∗ ( l og (Y[ ] / Y[ s s ] ) − l og ( Y f [ ] / Y f [ s s ] ) ) ) +
r D e l t a p i ∗ ( l og ( p i [ ] / p i [ s s ] ) − l og ( p i [−1 ] / p i [ s s ] ) ) +
r D e l t a y ∗ ( l og (Y [ ] / Y[ s s ] ) −
l og ( Y f [ ] / Y f [ s s ] ) −
( l og (Y[−1 ] / Y[ s s ] ) −
l og ( Y f [−1 ] / Y f [ s s ] ) ) ) +
eta R [ ] ;
l og ( p i o b j [ ] ) = ( 1 − r h o p i b a r ) ∗ l og ( c a l i b r p i o b j ) +
r h o p i b a r ∗ l og ( p i o b j [−1 ] ) + e t a p i [ ] ;
} ;
shocks
{
eta R [ ] , # I n t e r e s t r a t e shock
e t a p i [ ] ; # I n f l a t i o n o b j e c t i v e shock
} ;
13xˆt for any variable xt denotes the percentage deviation from the steady-state value (approximated by log xt − log x¯).
14Inflation objective p˚it is expressed as the logarithm of the actual gross inflation target.
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c a l i b r a t i o n
{
r D e l t a p i = 0 . 14 ; # Weight on the dynamics o f i n f l a t i o n
r De l t a y = 0 . 159 ; # Weight on the dynamics o f output gap
rho = 0 . 961 ; # I n t e r e s t r a t e smoothing parameter
r Y = 0 . 099 ; # Weight on the output gap
r p i = 1 . 684 ; # Weight on the i n f l a t i o n gap
p i o b j [ s s ] = 1 −> c a l i b r p i o b j ; # Ca l i b r a t i on o f the i n f l a t i o n o b j e c t i v e
p i [ s s ] = p i o b j [ s s ] −> c a l i b r p i ; # Ca l i b r a t i on o f the i n f l a t i o n
r h o p i b a r = 0 . 924 ; # AR parameter f o r the i n f l a t i o n o b j e c t i v e
} ;
} ;
Listing 14: The monetary policy rule
5 Market clearing conditions
The following relation holds between the demand and supply of capital (due to variable capital utilisation):
Kdt = ztKt−1.
Labour market clears:
Ldt = Lt.
Bond market clearing condition is:
Bt = 0.
Firms pay out their profits as dividends (Divt). The total dividend is therefore equal to the value of the total
output less compensation of labour and capital:
Divt = Yt − LdtWt −Kdt rkt . (62)
The final good market clears by Walras’ law.
Equilibrium conditions described in this section are collected in Listing 15.
block EQUILIBRIUM
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
K d [ ] = z [ ] ∗ K[−1 ] ;
L [ ] = L d [ ] ;
B [ ] = 0 ;
Div [ ] = Y [ ] − L d [ ] ∗ W[ ] − K d [ ] ∗ r k [ ] ;
} ;
} ;
Listing 15: Equilibrium conditions
Similar conditions hold for the flexible prices economy, cf. gEcon model implementation in Appendix B.
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6 Differences relative to [SW’03]
Intentional changes
One of the ways to introduce market inefficiency shocks is to make the mark-up parameter a stochastic
variable, e.g. by setting λw,t = λw + η
w
t , where η
w
t is a white noise process. However, such formulation
would make it impossible to write the first order conditions and the laws of motion for the price and wage
dispersion in a recursive form — one would not be able to factor out expressions involving λw,t or λp,t
in relevant equations. It has been decided that the aforesaid mark-up shocks will be introduced indirectly,
in an equivalent way (up to the first order approximation), by adding shocks to the price and wage equations.
Shocks to the labour and goods market inefficiencies are introduced in the form of stochastic disturbances ηwt
and ηpt to the first order conditions for the optimal wage (20) and price (49) in Calvo setting. The variances
of both shocks have been rescaled so that the impulse response functions are identical to those in [SW’03].
In this implementation of the [SW’03] model, the shock to the rate of return on equity investment has been
omitted. This shock is introduced in a non-structural way, it does not appear in any optimization problem.
Corrections
For the purpose of verifying the correctness of the model described in this paper and its gEcon implementa-
tion, a benchmark code consisting of the log-linearised equations quoted from [SW’03] and their counterparts
in the flexible prices economy has been written. This exercise allowed us to find two mistakes in the original
paper.
The log-linearised law of motion for capital (5) should be written as:
Kˆt = (1− τ)Kˆt−1 + τ Iˆt, (63)
where the variables with hats over them denote the percentage deviations from the steady state. In the original
paper investment (Iˆ) enters equation (31–SW’03) in lag.
Additionally, the log-linearised equilibrium condition should take the costs of variable capacity utilisation into
account. This can be noticed by combining budget constraints for all agents and market clearing conditions.
The log-linearised goods market equilibrium condition should therefore take the following form (the missing
term is underlined)15:
Yˆt =
(
1− τ Kss
Yss
− G¯
Yss
)
Cˆt + τ
Kss
Yss
Iˆt +
G¯
Yss
εˆGt +
Kss
Yss
r¯krˆkt ψ. (64)
There were no differences in the remaining equations.16
The first-order approximation of the [SW’03] model with equations (31–SW’03) and (35–SW’03) modified as
in (63) and (64) gave identical results as the model described in this paper.
7 Solution and simulation
Dynamic stochastic models are solved in gEcon in four steps. First, model equations, steady-state relation-
ships, and first order perturbation matrices are derived based on the model formulation. Then the steady
state is determined numerically. In the third step, first order approximation equations are solved. Finally,
based on the results of the third step and shock distribution parameters, model statistics are computed.
15Subscript ss denotes the steady-state values of variables.
16We have actually also changed the sign in front of the ηLt shock for consistency between shock sign and its interpretation,
see footnote on page 4.
26
gEcon automatically generates model equations, creating system of first order conditions, constraints, and
market clearing conditions. The model presented in Appendix B produces a system of 78 equations with 78 vari-
ables.17 The symbolic reduction algorithm implemented in gEcon allows to eliminate redundant variables
from the model, cf. the tryreduce section in the model code. As a result, the number of variables and
equations was reduced to 54.18
Eliminating some of the model variables and equations reduces the computational complexity of solving for
the steady state. Still, finding the solution using the nleqslv package [Hasselman 2013] called by gEcon
requires providing initial guesses for some of the variables. Note that the deterministic steady-state values of
capacity utilisation (zt, z
f
t ), Tobin’s q (Qt, Q
f
t ), inflation and its objective (pit, p˚it), as well as disturbances ε¯t
b,
ε¯t
L, ε¯t
a, ε¯t
I , ε¯t
G will all be equal to 1. In addition, as rates of return do not usually exceed few percentage
points, we have set initial values of rkt and r
k,f
t to 0.01. All these settings can be found in the R code in
Listing 17 in Appendix B. The obtained steady-state values of model variables are presented in Table 3
in Appendix C.
gEcon uses Christopher Sims’ solver (gensys, see [Sims 2002]) to find the first order approximation around
the steady state. The model variables were automatically log-linearised in gEcon by appropriate transfor-
mation of perturbation matrices.19 Perturbation solution indicates that the model has 19 state variables: ε¯b,
ε¯L, ε¯a, ε¯I , ε¯G, νpt , ν
w
t , pit, p˚it, Ct, C
f
t , It, I
f
t , Kt, K
f
t , Yt, Y
f
t , Wt, and Rt.
The computation of model statistics requires providing the variance-covariance matrix of shocks. Following
[SW’03] it has been assumed that shocks are uncorrelated — variance-covariance matrix is diagonal with
the entries given in Table 1.
ηb ηL ηI ηa ηw ηp ηG ηR ηpi
(0.3360)2 (3.52)2 (0.085)2 (0.598)2 (0.685)2 (0.790)2 (0.325)2 (0.081)2 (0.017)2
Table 1: Variances of model shocks
Second moments of variables were computed by gEcon using spectral methods. Standard deviations of
(log-linearised) model variables are presented in Table 3 in Appendix C. Correlations between variables,
autocorrelations and the decomposition of the variance for model variables can be found in Tables 4-7
in Appendix D.
Figure 1 shows the impulse response functions to a positive productivity shock and to a positive interest
rate shock. Impulse responses were computed under the assumption that the magnitudes of shocks are equal
to their standard deviations.
Appendix E contains the comparison of impulse response functions to all shocks in economies with and
without nominal rigidities.
17The initial model size is actually larger as gEcon automatically reduces Lagrange multipliers that were not explicitly named
by the user.
18Manual derivations, like those performed in [SW’03], allow to further reduce the number of variables, yet they are associated
with additional effort and involve risk of making a mistake as demonstrated in the case of equation (64).
19For detailed description of the method used for log-linearisation, see gEcon Users’ Guide [Klima et al. 2015], section 8.1.
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Figure 1: (a) Response to a productivity shock
(b) Response to an interest rate shock
8 Summary
In this paper we have shown how the benchmark DSGE model can be written and solved using the gEcon
package. We hope that our exercise highlights the advantages of using gEcon in DSGE modelling: model
implementation reflects the economic structure of the model, final set of equations describing model dynamics
is derived automatically, and any extensions or amendments to the model are easy to implement. We also
hope that our exposition and model implementation are clear and comprehensive enough to serve both
educational purposes and as a point of departure for building more complex models.
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Appendix A. List of variables in the model
Variables appearing in the flexible prices and wages economy are marked with a dagger (†).
.gcn file Paper Short description
– BNt Nominal bond holding
– Bf,Nt Nominal bond holding
†
– Pt Aggregate price level
B Bt = B
N
t /Pt Real bond holding
B f Bft = B
f,N
t /P
f
t Real bond holding
†
C Ct Real consumption
C f Cft Real consumption
†
Div Divt Real dividend
Div f Divft Real dividend
†
epsilon a εat Technology level
epsilon b εbt Level of shock to the discount
rate
epsilon G εGt Level of shock to the government
spending
epsilon I εIt Level of shock to the adjustment
cost function
epsilon L εLt Level of shock to the labour sup-
ply
f 1
f1t =
λt
1 + λw
L˜dt W˜t+
βξwEt
[(
piγwt
pit+1
)− 1
λw
(
W˜t+1
W˜t
) 1
λw
f1t+1
] Recursive formulation of (17)
f 2
f2t = ε
b
tε
L
t ω(L˜
d
t )
1+σl+
βξwEt
( piγwt
pit+1
)−(1+λw)(1+σl)
λw
(
W˜t+1
W˜t
) (1+λw)(1+σl)
λw
f2t+1
 Recursive formulation of (19)
G Gt Real government expenditures
g 1 g1t = λtpi
?
t Yt + (βξp)pi
?
tEt
[
1
pi?t+1
(
pi
γp
t
pit+1
)− 1
λp
g1t+1
]
Recursive formulation of (44)
g 2 g2t = λtmctyt + (βξp) Et
[(
pi
γp
t
pit+1
)− (1+λp)
λp
g2t+1
]
Recursive formulation of (45)
G f Gft Real government expenditures
†
H Ht Level of habit
H f Hft Level of habit
†
I It Real investments
I f Ift Real investments
†
Inc f Incft (i) Incomes of household from rent-
ing production factors†
K Kt Real capital stock
K d Kdt Aggregate demand for capital
K d f Kf,dt Aggregate demand for capital
†
K f Kft Real capital stock
K j d Kdt (j) Demand for capital of jth firm
K j d f Kf,dt (j) Demand for capital of jth firm
†
L Lt Aggregate labour supply
L d Ldt Aggregate labour demand
L d f Lf,dt Aggregate labour demand
†
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L f Lft Aggregate labour supply
†
L i f, L i star f Lft (i) Labour supplied by ith
household†
L i tilde L˜t(i) Demand for labour of households
reoptimising at t period
L j d Ldt (j) Demand of the jth firm for
labour
L j d f Lf,dt (j) Demand of the jth firm for
labour†
L s Lst Total supply of all types of dif-
ferentiated labour
L s f Lf,st Total supply of all types of dif-
ferentiated labour†
lambda λt Marginal utility of consumption
lambda f λft Marginal utility of consumption
†
mc mct Intermediate firm’s marginal
costs
mc f mcft Intermediate firm’s marginal
costs†
nu p νpt Price dispersion
nu w νwt Wage dispersion
P f P ft Aggregate price level
†
P j f P ft (j) Price of the jth good
†
pi pit =
Pt
Pt−1 Inflation rate
pi obj p˚it Inflation rate objective
Pi ps f Πf,pst Monopolistic price setter profit
†
pi star pi?t =
P˜t
Pt
Optimal-to-aggregate price ratio
pi star w pi?wt =
W˜t
Wt
Optimal-to-aggregate wage ratio
Pi ws f Πf,wst Monopolistic wage setter profit
†
q qt Lagrange multiplier on the law of
motion for the capital
Q Qt Tobin’s q
q f qft Lagrange multiplier on the law of
motion for the capital†
Q f Qft Tobin’s q
†
R Rt Nominal (gross) interest rate
R f Rft Nominal (gross) interest rate
†
r k rkt Rate of return from capital
r k f rf,kt Rate of return from capital
†
T Tt Real value of taxes
T f T ft Real value of taxes
†
tc j tct(j) Total cost of the jth firm
tc j f tcft (j) Total cost of the jth firm
†
U Ut Expected utility of households
u Ut Instantaneous utility
u f uft Instantaneous utility
†
U f Uft Expected utility of households
†
W Wt Aggregate real wage
W disutil f W f,disutilt Marginal disutility from labour
†
W f W ft Aggregate real wage
†
W i f W f (i) Wage for the labour supplied by
ith household†
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w star w?t Optimal price set in period t
Y Yt Aggregate product
Y f Y ft Aggregate product
†
Y j Yt(j) The product of the jth firm
Y j f Y ft (j) The product of the jth firm
†
Y s Y st Total amount of intermediate
goods produced
Y s f Y f,st Total amount of intermediate
goods produced†
z zt Capacity utilization
z f zft Capacity utilization
†
Table 2: Model variables
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Appendix B. The full gEcon implementation of the model with ac-
companying R code
# ###################################################################
# ( c ) Chance l l e ry o f the Prime Min i s t e r 2012−2015 #
# Licence terms can be found in the f i l e : #
# http :// gecon . r−f o r g e . r−p r o j e c t . org / f i l e s / gEcon l i c ence . txt #
# #
# Authors : Grzegorz Klima , Karol Podemski , #
# Kaja Retk iewicz−Wijtiwiak , Anna Sowin´ ska #
# ###################################################################
# DSGE model based on Smets Wouters ( 2003 ) , with c o r r e c t e d equat ions :
# − ( 31 ) The c o r r e c t l o g l i n e a r i s e d law o f motion f o r the c a p i t a l
# should be wr i t t en as : K[ ] = ( 1 − tau ) ∗ K[−1 ] + tau ∗ I [ ] .
# − ( 35 ) The goods market equ i l i b r i um cond i t i on should be wr i t t en as :
# Y P [ ] = ( 1 − tau ∗ k Y − g Y ) ∗ C [ ] + tau ∗ k Y ∗ I [ ] +
# g Y ∗ eps i l on G [ ] + k Y ∗ r k b a r ∗ r k [ ] ∗ p s i
# In the [SW’ 03 ] the l a s t term account ing f o r
# the co s t o f capac i ty u t i l i s a t i o n was miss ing .
# The shock \ eta ˆQ t from equat ion ( 30 ) has not been introduced .
# ###################################################################
opt ions
{
output LaTeX = TRUE; output LaTeX landscape = TRUE;
output l o g f i l e = TRUE;
verbose = TRUE;
} ;
t ry reduce
{
H[ ] , B [ ] , H f [ ] , B f [ ] , K j d [ ] , K j d f [ ] , K d [ ] , K d f [ ] , P f [ ] , p i s t a r w [ ] , t c j [ ] ,
t c j f [ ] , Y j [ ] ,
Y j f [ ] , Div [ ] , D iv f [ ] , L j d f [ ] , L j d [ ] , L d [ ] , L d f [ ] , lambda [ ] , lambda f [ ] , L i f
[ ] , L i s t a r f [ ] ;
} ;
block CONSUMER
{
d e f i n i t i o n s
{
u [ ] = e p s i l o n b [ ] ∗ ( (C [ ] − H [ ] ) ˆ ( 1 − s igma c ) / ( 1 − s igma c ) −
omega ∗ e p s i l o n L [ ] ∗ ( L s [ ] ) ˆ ( 1 + s igma l ) / ( 1 + s igma l ) ) ;
} ;
c o n t r o l s
{
C[ ] , K[ ] , I [ ] , B [ ] , z [ ] ;
} ;
o b j e c t i v e
{
U [ ] = u [ ] + beta ∗ E [ ] [ U[ 1 ] ] ;
} ;
c o n s t r a i n t s
{
C [ ] + I [ ] + B [ ] / R [ ] =
W[ ] ∗ L [ ] +
r k [ ] ∗ z [ ] ∗ K[−1 ] − r k [ s s ] / p s i ∗ ( exp ( p s i ∗ ( z [ ] − 1 ) ) − 1 ) ∗ K[−1 ] +
Div [ ] + B[−1 ] / p i [ ] − T [ ] : lambda [ ] ;
K [ ] = ( 1 − tau ) ∗ K[−1 ] +
( 1 − varphi / 2 ∗ ( e p s i l o n I [ ] ∗ I [ ] / I [−1 ] − 1 ) ˆ 2 ) ∗ I [ ] : q [ ] ;
} ;
i d e n t i t i e s
{
H [ ] = h ∗ C[−1 ] ;
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Q[ ] = q [ ] / lambda [ ] ;
} ;
c a l i b r a t i o n
{
beta = 0 . 99 ; # Discount f a c t o r
tau = 0 . 025 ; # Capi ta l d e p r e c i a t i o n ra t e
varphi = 6 . 771 ; # Parameter o f investment adjustment co s t func t i on
p s i = 0 . 169 ; # Capacity u t i l i s a t i o n co s t parameter
s igma c = 1 . 353 ; # C o e f f i c i e n t o f r e l a t i v e r i s k ave r s i on
h = 0 . 573 ; # Habit format ion i n t e n s i t y
s i gma l = 2 . 4 ; # Rec ip roca l o f labour e l a s t i c i t y w. r . t . wage
omega = 1 ; # Labour d i s u t i l i t y parameter
} ;
} ;
block PREFERENCE SHOCKS
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
l og ( e p s i l o n b [ ] ) = rho b ∗ l og ( e p s i l o n b [−1 ] ) + eta b [ ] ;
l og ( e p s i l o n L [ ] ) = rho L ∗ l og ( e p s i l o n L [−1 ] ) − eta L [ ] ;
} ;
shocks
{
e ta b [ ] , # Pre f e r ence shock
eta L [ ] ; # Labour supply shock
} ;
c a l i b r a t i o n
{
rho b = 0 . 855 ;
rho L = 0 . 889 ;
} ;
} ;
block INVESTMENT COST SHOCKS
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
l og ( e p s i l o n I [ ] ) = r h o I ∗ l og ( e p s i l o n I [−1 ] ) + e t a I [ ] ;
} ;
shocks
{
e t a I [ ] ; # Investment shock
} ;
c a l i b r a t i o n
{
r h o I = 0 . 927 ;
} ;
} ;
block WAGE SETTING PROBLEM
{
d e f i n i t i o n s
{
L sta r [ ] = ( p i s t a r w [ ] ) ˆ (−( ( 1 + lambda w ) / lambda w ) ) ∗ L [ ] ;
}
i d e n t i t i e s
{
f 1 [ ] = 1 / ( 1 + lambda w ) ∗ w star [ ] ∗ lambda [ ] ∗ L sta r [ ] +
beta ∗ xi w ∗ E [ ] [ ( ( p i [ ] ˆ gamma w) / p i [ 1 ] ) ˆ (−1 / lambda w ) ∗
( w star [ 1 ] / w star [ ] ) ˆ ( 1 / lambda w ) ∗ f 1 [ 1 ] ] ;
f 2 [ ] = e p s i l o n L [ ] ∗ omega ∗ e p s i l o n b [ ] ∗ ( L s ta r [ ] ) ˆ ( 1 + s igma l ) +
beta ∗ xi w ∗ E [ ] [ ( ( p i [ ] ˆ gamma w) / p i [ 1 ] ) ˆ
(−( ( 1 + lambda w ) / lambda w ) ∗ ( 1 + s igma l ) ) ∗
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( w star [ 1 ] / w star [ ] ) ˆ ( ( ( 1 + lambda w ) / lambda w ) ∗ ( 1 + s igma l ) ) ∗ f 2 [ 1
] ] ;
f 1 [ ] = f 2 [ ] + eta w [ ] ;
p i s t a r w [ ] = w star [ ] / W[ ] ;
} ;
shocks
{
eta w [ ] ; # Wage mark−up shock
} ;
c a l i b r a t i o n
{
gamma w = 0 . 763 ; # Indexat ion parameter f o r non−opt imi s ing workers
lambda w = 0 . 5 ; # Wage mark−up
xi w = 0 . 737 ; # P ro b a b i l i t y o f not r e c e i v i n g ‘ ‘ wage−change s i gna l ’ ’
} ;
} ;
block WAGE EVOLUTION
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
1 = xi w ∗ ( ( p i [−1 ] ˆ gamma w) / p i [ ] ) ˆ (−1 / lambda w ) ∗
(W[−1 ] / W[ ] ) ˆ (−1 / lambda w ) + ( 1 − xi w ) ∗ ( p i s t a r w [ ] ) ˆ (−1 / lambda w ) ;
} ;
} ;
block LABOUR AGGREGATION
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
nu w [ ] = ( 1 − xi w ) ∗ p i s t a r w [ ] ˆ (−( ( 1 + lambda w ) / lambda w ) ) +
xi w ∗ ( (W[−1 ] /W[ ] ) ∗ ( ( p i [−1 ] ˆgamma w) / p i [ ] ) ) ˆ
(−( ( 1 + lambda w ) / lambda w ) ) ∗ nu w [−1 ] ;
L [ ] = L s [ ] / nu w [ ] ;
} ;
} ;
block CONSUMER FLEXIBLE
{
d e f i n i t i o n s
{
u f [ ] = e p s i l o n b [ ] ∗ ( ( C f [ ] − H f [ ] ) ˆ ( 1 − s igma c ) / ( 1 − s igma c ) −
omega ∗ e p s i l o n L [ ] ∗ L s f [ ] ˆ ( 1 + s igma l ) / ( 1 + s igma l ) ) ;
I n c i f [ ] = W d i s u t i l f [ ] ∗ L s f [ ] + P i ws f [ ] +
r k f [ ] ∗ z f [ ] ∗ K f [−1 ] −
r k f [ s s ] / p s i ∗ ( exp ( p s i ∗ ( z f [ ] − 1 ) ) − 1 ) ∗ K f [−1 ] ;
} ;
c o n t r o l s
{
C f [ ] , K f [ ] , I f [ ] , B f [ ] , z f [ ] , L s f [ ] ;
} ;
o b j e c t i v e
{
U f [ ] = u f [ ] + beta ∗ E [ ] [ U f [ 1 ] ] ;
} ;
c o n s t r a i n t s
{
C f [ ] + I f [ ] + B f [ ] / R f [ ] =
I n c i f [ ] + Div f [ ] + B f [−1 ] − T f [ ] : lambda f [ ] ;
K f [ ] = ( 1 − tau ) ∗ K f [−1 ] +
( 1 − varphi / 2 ∗ ( e p s i l o n I [ ] ∗ I f [ ] / I f [−1 ] − 1 ) ˆ2 ) ∗ I f [ ] : q f [ ] ;
} ;
i d e n t i t i e s
{
H f [ ] = h ∗ C f [−1 ] ;
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Q f [ ] = q f [ ] / lambda f [ ] ;
} ;
} ;
block FLEXIBLE MONOPOLISTIC WORKER
{
c o n t r o l s
{
W i f [ ] , L i s t a r f [ ] ;
} ;
o b j e c t i v e
{
Pi ws f [ ] = ( W i f [ ] − W d i s u t i l f [ ] ) ∗ L i s t a r f [ ] ;
} ;
c o n s t r a i n t s
{
L i s t a r f [ ] = L f [ ] ∗ ( W i f [ ] / W f [ ] ) ˆ (−( 1 + lambda w ) / lambda w ) ;
} ;
i d e n t i t i e s
{
L i s t a r f [ ] = L i f [ ] ;
} ;
} ;
block LABOUR AGGREGATION FLEXIBLE
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
L s f [ ] = L i f [ ] ;
L f [ ] = L s f [ ] ;
} ;
} ;
block FIRM
{
c o n t r o l s
{
K j d [ ] , L j d [ ] ;
} ;
o b j e c t i v e
{
t c j [ ] = − L j d [ ] ∗ W[ ] − K j d [ ] ∗ r k [ ] ;
} ;
c o n s t r a i n t s
{
Y j [ ] = e p s i l o n a [ ] ∗ K j d [ ] ˆ alpha ∗ L j d [ ] ˆ ( 1 − alpha ) − Phi : mc [ ] ;
} ;
c a l i b r a t i o n
{
alpha = 0 . 3 ; # Capi ta l share in output
( Y j [ s s ] + Phi ) / Y j [ s s ] = 1 . 408 −> Phi ; # Ca l i b r a t i on o f f i x e d c o s t s
} ;
} ;
block TECHNOLOGY
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
l og ( e p s i l o n a [ ] ) = rho a ∗ l og ( e p s i l o n a [−1 ] ) + eta a [ ] ;
} ;
shocks
{
e ta a [ ] ; # Product iv i ty shock
} ;
c a l i b r a t i o n
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{
rho a = 0 . 823 ;
} ;
} ;
block PRICE SETTING PROBLEM
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
g 1 [ ] = ( 1 + lambda p ) ∗ g 2 [ ] + eta p [ ] ;
g 1 [ ] = lambda [ ] ∗ p i s t a r [ ] ∗ Y [ ] + beta ∗ x i p ∗
E [ ] [ ( p i [ ] ˆ gamma p / pi [ 1 ] ) ˆ (−1 / lambda p ) ∗
( p i s t a r [ ] / p i s t a r [ 1 ] ) ∗ g 1 [ 1 ] ] ;
g 2 [ ] = lambda [ ] ∗ mc [ ] ∗ Y [ ] + beta ∗ x i p ∗
E [ ] [ ( p i [ ] ˆ gamma p / pi [ 1 ] ) ˆ (−( ( 1 + lambda p ) / lambda p ) ) ∗ g 2 [ 1 ] ] ;
} ;
shocks
{
e ta p [ ] ; # Pr i ce mark−up shock
} ;
c a l i b r a t i o n
{
x i p = 0 . 908 ; # P r ob a b i l i t y o f not r e c e i v i n g the ‘ ‘ p r i c e−change s i gna l ’ ’
gamma p = 0 . 469 ; # Indexat ion parameter f o r non−opt imi s ing f i rms
} ;
} ;
block PRICE EVOLUTION
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
1 = x i p ∗ ( p i [−1 ] ˆ gamma p / pi [ ] ) ˆ (−1 / lambda p ) +
( 1 − x i p ) ∗ p i s t a r [ ] ˆ (−1 / lambda p ) ;
} ;
} ;
block FACTOR DEMAND AGGREGATION
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
K d [ ] = K j d [ ] ;
L d [ ] = L j d [ ] ;
} ;
} ;
block PRODUCT AGGREGATION
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
Y s [ ] = Y j [ ] ;
nu p [ ] = ( 1 − x i p ) ∗ p i s t a r [ ] ˆ (−( ( 1 + lambda p ) / lambda p ) )
+ x i p ∗ ( p i [−1 ] ˆ gamma p / pi [ ] ) ˆ
(−( ( 1 + lambda p ) / lambda p ) ) ∗ nu p [−1 ] ;
Y [ ] ∗ nu p [ ] = Y s [ ] ;
} ;
} ;
block FIRM FLEXIBLE
{
c o n t r o l s
{
K j d f [ ] , L j d f [ ] ;
} ;
o b j e c t i v e
{
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t c j f [ ] = − L j d f [ ] ∗ W f [ ] − K j d f [ ] ∗ r k f [ ] ;
} ;
c o n s t r a i n t s
{
Y j f [ ] = e p s i l o n a [ ] ∗ K j d f [ ] ˆ alpha ∗ L j d f [ ] ˆ ( 1 − alpha ) − Phi : mc f [ ] ;
} ;
} ;
block PRICE SETTING PROBLEM FLEXIBLE
{
c o n t r o l s
{
Y j f [ ] , P j f [ ] ;
} ;
o b j e c t i v e
{
P i p s f [ ] = ( P j f [ ] − mc f [ ] ) ∗ Y j f [ ] ;
} ;
c o n s t r a i n t s
{
Y j f [ ] = ( P j f [ ] / P f [ ] ) ˆ (−( ( 1 + lambda p ) / lambda p ) ) ∗ Y f [ ] ;
} ;
c a l i b r a t i o n
{
C f [ s s ] / Y f [ s s ] = 0 . 6 −> lambda p ; # Ca l i b ra t i on o f the p r i c e mark−up
} ;
} ;
block FACTOR DEMAND AGGREGATION FLEXIBLE
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
K d f [ ] = K j d f [ ] ;
L d f [ ] = L j d f [ ] ;
} ;
} ;
block PRODUCT AGGREGATION FLEXIBLE
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
Y s f [ ] = Y j f [ ] ;
Y f [ ] = Y s f [ ] ;
} ;
} ;
block PRICE EVOLUTION FLEXIBLE
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
P f [ ] = 1 ;
} ;
} ;
block GOVERNMENT
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
G[ ] = G bar ∗ eps i l on G [ ] ;
G[ ] + B[−1 ] / p i [ ] = T [ ] + B [ ] / R [ ] ;
} ;
c a l i b r a t i o n
{
G[ s s ] / Y[ s s ] = 0 . 18 −> G bar ; # Ca l i b ra t i on o f the steady s t a t e government
expend i ture s
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} ;
} ;
block GOVERNMENT SPENDING SHOCK
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
l og ( eps i l on G [ ] ) = rho G ∗ l og ( eps i l on G [−1 ] ) + eta G [ ] ;
} ;
shocks
{
eta G [ ] ; # Government spending shock
} ;
c a l i b r a t i o n
{
rho G = 0 . 949 ;
} ;
} ;
block GOVERNMENT FLEXIBLE
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
G f [ ] = G bar ∗ eps i l on G [ ] ;
G f [ ] + B f [−1 ] = T f [ ] + B f [ ] / R f [ ] ;
} ;
} ;
block MONETARY POLICY AUTHORITY
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
l og (R [ ] / R[ s s ] ) + c a l i b r p i = rho ∗ l og (R[−1 ] / R[ s s ] ) +
( 1 − rho ) ∗ ( l og ( p i o b j [ ] ) +
r p i ∗ ( l og ( p i [−1 ] / p i [ s s ] ) − l og ( p i o b j [ ] ) ) +
r Y ∗ ( l og (Y[ ] / Y[ s s ] ) − l og ( Y f [ ] / Y f [ s s ] ) ) ) +
r D e l t a p i ∗ ( l og ( p i [ ] / p i [ s s ] ) − l og ( p i [−1 ] / p i [ s s ] ) ) +
r D e l t a y ∗ ( l og (Y [ ] / Y[ s s ] ) −
l og ( Y f [ ] / Y f [ s s ] ) −
( l og (Y[−1 ] / Y[ s s ] ) −
l og ( Y f [−1 ] / Y f [ s s ] ) ) ) +
eta R [ ] ;
l og ( p i o b j [ ] ) = ( 1 − r h o p i b a r ) ∗ l og ( c a l i b r p i o b j ) +
r h o p i b a r ∗ l og ( p i o b j [−1 ] ) + e t a p i [ ] ;
} ;
shocks
{
eta R [ ] , # I n t e r e s t r a t e shock
e t a p i [ ] ; # I n f l a t i o n o b j e c t i v e shock
} ;
c a l i b r a t i o n
{
r D e l t a p i = 0 . 14 ; # Weight on the dynamics o f i n f l a t i o n
r De l t a y = 0 . 159 ; # Weight on the dynamics o f output gap
rho = 0 . 961 ; # I n t e r e s t r a t e smoothing parameter
r Y = 0 . 099 ; # Weight on the output gap
r p i = 1 . 684 ; # Weight on the i n f l a t i o n gap
p i o b j [ s s ] = 1 −> c a l i b r p i o b j ; # Ca l i b r a t i on o f the i n f l a t i o n o b j e c t i v e
p i [ s s ] = p i o b j [ s s ] −> c a l i b r p i ; # Ca l i b r a t i on o f the i n f l a t i o n
r h o p i b a r = 0 . 924 ; # AR parameter f o r the i n f l a t i o n o b j e c t i v e
} ;
} ;
block EQUILIBRIUM
{
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i d e n t i t i e s
{
K d [ ] = z [ ] ∗ K[−1 ] ;
L [ ] = L d [ ] ;
B [ ] = 0 ;
Div [ ] = Y [ ] − L d [ ] ∗ W[ ] − K d [ ] ∗ r k [ ] ;
} ;
} ;
block EQUILIBRIUM FLEXIBLE
{
i d e n t i t i e s
{
K d f [ ] = z f [ ] ∗ K f [−1 ] ;
L f [ ] = L d f [ ] ;
B f [ ] = 0 ;
Div f [ ] = Y f [ ] − L d f [ ] ∗ W f [ ] − K d f [ ] ∗ r k f [ ] ;
} ;
} ;
Listing 16: The full gEcon implementation of the model
# ###################################################################
# ( c ) Chance l l e ry o f the Prime Min i s t e r 2012−2015 #
# Licence terms can be found in the f i l e : #
# http : // gecon . r−f o r g e . r−p r o j e c t . org / f i l e s /gEcon l i c e n c e . txt #
# #
# Authors : Grzegorz Klima , Karol Podemski , #
# Kaja Retkiewicz−Wijtiwiak , Anna Sowin´ ska #
# ###################################################################
l i b r a r y ( gEcon )
sw gecon <− make model ( ’SW 03 . gcn ’ )
i n i t v <− l i s t ( z = 1 , z f = 1 , Q = 1 , Q f = 1 , p i = 1 , p i obj = 1 ,
e p s i l o n b = 1 , e p s i l o n L = 1 , e p s i l o n I = 1 , e p s i l o n a = 1 , e p s i l o n G = 1 ,
r k = 0 .01 , r k f = 0 . 0 1 )
sw gecon <− i n i t v a l var ( sw gecon , i n i t var = i n i t v )
sw gecon <− steady s t a t e ( sw gecon )
sw gecon <− s o l v e per t ( sw gecon , l o g l i n = TRUE)
summary( sw gecon )
a <− c ( eta b = 0.336 ˆ 2 , eta L = 3.52 ˆ 2 , eta I = 0.085 ˆ 2 , eta a = 0.598 ˆ 2 ,
eta w = 0.6853261 ˆ 2 , eta p = 0.7896512 ˆ 2 ,
eta G = 0.325 ˆ 2 , eta R = 0.081 ˆ 2 , eta p i = 0.017 ˆ 2)
sw gecon <− s e t shock cov mat( sw gecon , shock matrix = diag ( a ) , shock order = names ( a ) )
shock i n f o ( sw gecon , a l l shocks = TRUE)
sw gecon <− compute moments ( sw gecon )
get moments ( sw gecon )
sw gecon i r f <− compute i r f ( sw gecon , var l i s t = c ( ’C ’ , ’Y ’ , ’K ’ , ’ I ’ , ’L ’ ) , cho l = T,
shock l i s t = l i s t ( ’ e ta a ’ , ’ e ta R ’ ) , path l ength = 40)
p l o t s imu la t i on ( sw gecon i r f )
Listing 17: The accompanying R code
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Appendix C. Steady-state values of model variables and standard
deviations of the log-linearised variables
Variable Steady-state value Standard deviation
epsilon L 1 4.4929
epsilon b 1 0.4207
epsilon I 1 0.1103
epsilon a 1 0.7338
epsilon G 1 0.4236
f 1 8.7708 0.8265
f 2 8.7708 0.8314
g 1 48.8253 1.8874
g 2 35.7045 1.8874
mc 0.7313 0.8206
mc f 0.7313 0
nu w 1 0
nu p 1 0
pi 1 0.1145
pi obj 1 0.0220
pi star 1 0.7093
q 2.4577 0.3662
q f 2.4577 0.4179
r k 0.0351 0.1520
r k f 0.0351 0.1934
w star 1.1227 0.6559
z 1 0.8992
z f 1 1.1442
C 1.2049 0.7154
C f 1.2049 1.4816
G 0.3615 0.4236
G f 0.3615 0.4236
I 0.4418 1.8279
I f 0.4418 2.6127
K 17.6712 0.2275
K f 17.6712 0.2981
L 1.2891 0.9894
L s 1.2891 0.9894
L s f 1.2891 1.1104
L f 1.2891 1.1104
P j f 1 0
Pi ws f 0.4824 1.1952
Pi ps f 0.5396 1.6828
Q 1 0.9374
Q f 1 2.7021
R 1.0101 0.2153
R f 1.0101 1.1384
T 0.3615 0.4236
T f 0.3615 0.4236
U -427.937 0.0694
U f -427.937 0.0685
W 1.1227 0.3847
W disutil f 0.7485 1.0047
W i f 1.1227 1.0047
41
W f 1.1227 1.0047
Y 2.0081 0.9158
Y s 2.0081 0.9158
Y f 2.0081 1.6828
Y s f 2.0081 1.6828
Table 3: The steady-state values of model variables and standard deviations of the log-linearised variables
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Appendix D. Correlations and the decomposition of variance
t−1 t−2 t−3 t−4 t−5
pi 0.8807 0.6745 0.4521 0.2453 0.0675
rk 0.7406 0.5165 0.3259 0.1668 0.0369
z 0.7406 0.5165 0.3259 0.1668 0.0369
C 0.8710 0.6373 0.3843 0.1546 -0.0336
I 0.9450 0.8182 0.6499 0.4634 0.2760
K 0.9796 0.9208 0.8287 0.7102 0.5730
L 0.7052 0.4567 0.2534 0.0919 -0.0325
Q 0.6716 0.3950 0.1791 0.0185 -0.0958
R 0.7709 0.4956 0.2532 0.0622 -0.0789
T 0.7130 0.4706 0.2705 0.1093 -0.0169
W 0.9502 0.8308 0.6685 0.4852 0.2981
Y 0.9049 0.7264 0.5191 0.3142 0.1286
Table 4: Autocorrelations of selected variables
Yt−5 Yt−4 Yt−3 Yt−2 Yt−1 Yt Yt+1 Yt+2 Yt+3 Yt+4 Yt+5
pi -0.0302 0.0149 0.0695 0.1342 0.2089 0.2918 0.3054 0.2829 0.2421 0.1928 0.1412
rk 0.0634 0.1539 0.2602 0.3818 0.5177 0.6641 0.6386 0.5393 0.4065 0.2649 0.1293
z 0.0634 0.1539 0.2602 0.3818 0.5177 0.6641 0.6386 0.5393 0.4065 0.2649 0.1293
C 0.2858 0.4541 0.6276 0.7837 0.8829 0.8571 0.6559 0.4004 0.1541 -0.0538 -0.2132
I -0.0533 0.1257 0.3315 0.5496 0.7521 0.8889 0.9085 0.8464 0.7317 0.5871 0.4300
K -0.6653 -0.6234 -0.5412 -0.4173 -0.2558 -0.0709 0.1134 0.2806 0.4205 0.5279 0.6011
L -0.0246 0.0658 0.1773 0.3103 0.4633 0.6313 0.6174 0.5280 0.4056 0.2752 0.1513
Q 0.4149 0.5390 0.6490 0.7187 0.7038 0.5322 0.1992 -0.0471 -0.2176 -0.3261 -0.3858
R -0.3352 -0.4182 -0.4867 -0.5194 -0.4803 -0.3114 -0.0556 0.1372 0.2635 0.3345 0.3632
T -0.0142 -0.0061 0.0057 0.0224 0.0456 0.0778 0.0584 0.0416 0.0274 0.0156 0.0061
W -0.1606 -0.1421 -0.1138 -0.0747 -0.0236 0.0398 0.1153 0.1829 0.2337 0.2647 0.2764
Y 0.1286 0.3142 0.5191 0.7264 0.9049 1 0.9049 0.7264 0.5191 0.3142 0.1286
Table 5: Correlations of selected variables with product
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ηpi ηb ηL ηI ηw ηa ηp ηG ηR
pi 0.0036 0.0034 0.1088 0.0002 0 0.2145 0.0002 0.0003 0.6691
rk 0.0011 0.0050 0.1087 0.0004 0 0.4632 0 0.0026 0.4189
z 0.0011 0.0050 0.1087 0.0004 0 0.4632 0 0.0026 0.4189
C 0.0007 0.0462 0.4269 0.0003 0 0.2144 0 0.0013 0.3102
I 0.0010 0.0116 0.4314 0.0032 0 0.1782 0 0.0008 0.3737
K 0.0011 0.0113 0.4397 0.0034 0 0.1643 0 0.0010 0.3793
L 0.0004 0.0034 0.2564 0.0002 0 0.5695 0 0.0029 0.1672
Q 0.0006 0.0104 0.3712 0.0005 0 0.2537 0 0.0003 0.3633
R 0.0005 0.0108 0.3976 0.0001 0 0.4912 0 0.0004 0.0994
T 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
W 0.0018 0.0113 0.4010 0.0002 0.0001 0.0120 0 0.0004 0.5731
Y 0.0011 0.0090 0.4081 0.0005 0 0.1125 0 0.0065 0.4624
Table 7: The decomposition of variance for selected variables
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Appendix E. Impulse response functions in economies with and
without nominal rigidities
Impulse responses to a positive productivity shock
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Figure 2: (a) Response to a productivity shock in the economy without rigidities
(b) Response to a productivity shock in the economy with rigidities
Periods
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 th
e 
ste
ad
y 
sta
te
1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
−
1.
0
−
0.
5
 
0.
0
 
0.
5
 
1.
0
pi_f r_k_f R_f W_f
Periods
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 th
e 
ste
ad
y 
sta
te
1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
−
0.
12
5
−
0.
10
0
−
0.
07
5
−
0.
05
0
−
0.
02
5
 
0.
00
0
 
0.
02
5
 
0.
05
0
 
0.
07
5
pi R W r_k
a) b)
Figure 3: (a) Response to a productivity shock in the economy without rigidities
(b) Response to a productivity shock in the economy with rigidities
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Impulse responses to a positive interest rate shock
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Figure 4: (a) Response to an interest rate shock in the economy without rigidities
(b) Response to an interest rate shock in the economy with rigidities
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Figure 5: (a) Response to an interest rate shock in the economy without rigidities
(b) Response to an interest rate shock in the economy with rigidities
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Impulse responses to a positive government spending shock
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Figure 6: (a) Response to a government spending shock in the economy without rigidities
(b) Response to a government spending shock in the economy with rigidities
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Figure 7: (a) Response to a government spending shock in the economy without rigidities
(b) Response to a government spending shock in the economy with rigidities
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Impulse responses to a negative investment shock
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Figure 8: (a) Response to a negative investment shock in the economy without rigidities
(b) Response to a negative investment shock in the economy with rigidities
Periods
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 th
e 
ste
ad
y 
sta
te
1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
−
0.
00
2
−
0.
00
1
 
0.
00
0
 
0.
00
1
 
0.
00
2
 
0.
00
3
 
0.
00
4
 
0.
00
5
pi_f r_k_f R_f W_f
Periods
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 th
e 
ste
ad
y 
sta
te
1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
−
0.
00
8
−
0.
00
6
−
0.
00
4
−
0.
00
2
 
0.
00
0
 
0.
00
2
 
0.
00
4
 
0.
00
6
pi R W r_k
a) b)
Figure 9: (a) Response to a negative investment shock in the economy without rigidities
(b) Response to a negative investment shock in the economy with rigidities
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Impulse responses to a positive labour shock
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Figure 10: (a) Response to a labour shock in the economy without rigidities
(b) Response to a labour shock in the economy with rigidities
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Figure 11: (a) Response to a labour shock in the economy without rigidities
(b) Response to a labour shock in the economy with rigidities
50
Impulse responses to a positive time preference shock
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Figure 12: (a) Response to a time preference shock in the economy without rigidities
(b) Response to a time preference shock in the economy with rigidities
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Figure 13: (a) Response to a time preference shock in the economy without rigidities
(b) Response to a time preference shock in the economy with rigidities
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Impulse responses to a positive inflation objective shock
Periods
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 th
e 
ste
ad
y 
sta
te
1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
−
1
 
0
 
1
C_f I_f K_f Y_f L_f
Periods
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 th
e 
ste
ad
y 
sta
te
1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
−
0.
01
 
0.
00
 
0.
01
 
0.
02
 
0.
03
 
0.
04
 
0.
05
 
0.
06
C I K Y L
a) b)
Figure 14: (a) Response to an inflation objective shock in the economy without rigidities
(b) Response to an inflation objective shock in the economy with rigidities
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Figure 15: (a) Response to an inflation objective shock in the economy without rigidities
(b) Response to an inflation objective shock in the economy with rigidities
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Impulse responses to a positive price mark-up shock
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Figure 16: (a) Response to a price mark-up shock in the economy without rigidities
(b) Response to a price mark-up shock in the economy with rigidities
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Figure 17: (a) Response to a price mark-up shock in the economy without rigidities
(b) Response to a price mark-up shock in the economy with rigidities
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Impulse responses to a positive wage mark-up shock
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Figure 18: (a) Response to a wage mark-up shock in the economy without rigidities
(b) Response to a wage mark-up shock in the economy with rigidities
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Figure 19: (a) Response to a wage mark-up shock in the economy without rigidities
(b) Response to a wage mark-up shock in the economy with rigidities
54
